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CHAPTER I – Introduction  
 
In daily life, individuals have started to become aware of the terms like financial technology (“fintech”), 
big-tech and digital finance. While these terms cover an essential part of our live today, the question 
which should be answered is how and when the awareness came up to this point. While technological 
growth was been exponential, the millennial or generation Y shaped emergence of new technologies 
(multimedia PCs and fast data communications) and the openness of social interaction. With this new 
generation and new category of customers came new consumption habits that were matched with what 
these new technologies offered.1 At first, technological improvements were used to ease the daily life, 
however, over time they started to change it changed the way we live over time. Some existing business 
models thereby ceased to exist, new business models occurred were introduced and it became more 
convenient to establish a business.  
 
In business, the utilization of innovations such as loud computing, machine learning, predictive analytics, 
and business intelligence tools, Artificial Intelligence (AI) now creating new methods to conduct and 
manage the business.2 In addition, these entrepreneurs had several difficulties due to the fact that either 
traditional financial services providers are reluctant to take on risk or it was not possible to deliver the 
service. All these reasons have created a fertilise ground for the new alternative finance and financial 
technology (Fintech) services, as well as they helped traditional players to deliver better products. It is 
worth noting to explain few definitions. Even though there is not a widely common definition for fintech, 
it can be defined as “computer programs and other technology used to support or enable banking and 
financial services”. 3 Big Tech refers to “the major technology companies such as Apple, Google, 
Amazon and Facebook, which have an inordinate influence”.4 
 
Today, it is an undeniable fact that Fintech exists in almost every part of financial products, both in the 
products of incumbents and new entrants. This dissertation is mainly going to focus on the non-
traditional financial services due to the fact that they are relatively new in the sector and have gained 
                                                 
1 Tom McGee, “How Millennials Are Changing Retail Patterns” 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tommcgee/2017/01/23/the-rise-of-the-millennial/#1b6175015f74 
2 Ibid 
3 https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/fintech 
4 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/08/technology/antitrust-amazon-apple-facebook-google.html 
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unprecedented level of prominence. These mentioned services are increasingly affecting customers, 
financial institutions and the financial system as a whole. Whilst the range of fintech products are 
extremely broad, for the purposes of this dissertation certain types of fintech products (digital payment 
services, peer to peer lending & crowdfunding, cryptocurrency and robo-advisors) will be studied. There 
are two reasons why these products are chosen: they are the ones that mostly attract individuals and 
entrepreneurs; thus, customer protection and financial stability concerns are at stake.  
 
While fintech products boost innovation and present unique opportunities, they do not evolve in a 
vacuum and as such there will be new risks and challenges.  Especially after the Global Financial Crisis 
(“the Crisis”) in 2008, developments in the financial sector have been under the spotlight. The legal 
issue is that fintech is still not sufficiently regulated (or in some countries not regulated at all). Regulators 
are now challenged with the need to address a wide range of regulatory objectives and policy priorities 
in order to enable a healthy environment for the development of fintech ecosystem.5  
 
Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is to come up with the most appropriate regulatory approach 
for fintech services, wherever their activities are not fully regulated or not regulated at all. In other words, 
the aim is to determine what type of regulatory framework could foster innovation whilst not threatening 
consumer interests and financial stability. The reason why this dissertation is not going to specifically 
focus on a certain region or country is that fintech platforms are based on online operation, rather than 
in a particular place of operation, and because customers of these products can conveniently access 
them from all around the world. Therefore, regulators should come up with a sequential reform process. 
The potential global regulatory approach must exhibit an understanding of the underlying conceptual 
framework of the particular service type(s) it aims to regulate. This dissertation provides a roadmap for 
this process and in the end, it aims to provide the best approach that should be built on shared principles 
from a variety of jurisdictions. 
 
                                                 
5 Chris Brummer discusses the new objectives faced by regulators following the GFC. See Chris 
Brummer, ‘Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation’ (2015) 84 Fordham Law Review 977, 
1037.  
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This dissertation will have four main bodies which will help to reach the intended outcome.  First, Chapter 
II, the historical development of fintech will be summarized/set out to provide comprehensive 
background information. For this purpose, the Crisis will be considered as a turning point, particularly 
with regard to how the regulatory approach towards financial products was at that time and how the 
financial sector was affected by the Crisis. By doing so, past experiences will be reminded/absorbed, 
which will be of great benefit to the shaping of today’s regulatory approach. Further in this chapter, as 
mentioned above, some of the fintech products will be explained in order to understand how they 
function and understand what the underlying reasoning behind their innovation is.  
 
In Chapter III, the advantages and risks of these financial products will be analyzed. This will 
answer/address the question of whether the benefits outweigh the risks or vice versa, which in turn, will 
shape the regulatory approach. In other words, some of the risk identified in this chapter may be 
overlooked considering the anticipated benefits; yet some others impose high risks that have to be 
coddled. In Chapter IV, possible approaches to the regulation of these products, which vary from not 
regulating to specific regulations. It will be argued which regulatory approach will be best suited to these 
products as well as which of them would suppress the speed of innovation or would be detrimental for 
financial stability and consumer protection. Chapter V will provide an analysis of the regulatory approach 
for the most invested two countries, which are China and the UK. Each country has a different regulatory 
attitude towards fintech and so this will enable to analyze whether the theoretical justifications for 
regulations coherent with practice. Further in this chapter, a tailored regulatory regime will be defined. 
 
Chapter II – New Term for An Old Relationship  
 
 2.1. Evolution of Fintech 
 
The relationship of the financial sector and technology, in this chapter, will be historically analysed and 
the underlying reasons for the development of fintech will be explained.  It will not be wrong to assess 
the Crisis as a milestone for the development of digital financial products. Therefore, there is a great 
benefit to divide the development of the financial sector as before and after the Crisis, which will provide 
« Regulating Financial Technology – Opportunities and Risks» 
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a comprehensive understanding of the underlying reason for the shift in the sector. Further, in this 
chapter, the main fintech services will be briefly studied. 
 
1. Before 2008 Global Finance Crisis 
 
Even though the participation of technology in finance deemed like a new feature, their relationship goes 
date back a long time.6 The technology that has widely used in today’s finance industry has begun in 
the late 1960s with the advances in automated clearing services.7 For instance, the Society of Worldwide 
Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) constituted in 1973, which is “used for provides a 
network that enables financial institutions worldwide to send and receive information about financial 
transactions in a secure, standardized and reliable environment.”8 
 
The appearance of the internet has led to profound changes in the finance industry in the 90s, after 
which rapid developments created the divergence of services through traditional and new channels.9 
The online banking activities dramatically increased after the ‘90s, which hit  a peak by 90% of the 
commercial banks had online banking in 2011.10 It is emphasized that the promotion of Automatic Teller 
Machines (ATM’s) in 1967 have a significant impact on today’s fintech as well as in the financial crisis, 
by which money withdrawals become convenient.11  The new entrants from outside of traditional 
banking, such as PayPal, have become a significant player in the industry, especially growth in Peer to 
Peer (P2P) payment methods.12  
 
While the trace of the innovation can be seen in banks, there is a perception that technological 
development by banks is not accepted as Financial Technologies and the reason for this explained by 
                                                 
6 Tom Standage, The Victorian Internet: The Remarkable Story of the Telegraph and the Nineteenth 
Century’s On-line Pioneers (New York: Bloomsbury, 1998). 
7 Douglas Arner and others, “The Evolution of FinTech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm.” (2015) 4 47 
Geo. J. Int'l L. 1271 pg.1271 
8 Ibid 
9  Ibid  
10 David Lee Kuo Chuen and Robert H. Deng “Handbook of Blockchain, digital finance and inclusion 
Vol.1 (Academic Press 2018) 
11 Thomas Lerner - Mobile Payment Springer (Vieweg 2013) 
12 Lee (n.10) 
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that the purpose of the innovation in finance to get rid of agents or banks.13 The financial services had 
transformed into the digital industry for all purposes in the late ‘90s.14 For instance, by 2000s, eight 
banks in the US has already had a million customers who benefit online services and as well as the first 
online bank branches, without physical branches, launched in the UK.15 
 
While the technological developments have accelerated the growth of financial services, the risks have 
been accompanied with it. The establishment of the first international committee regarding financial 
matters arose due to the bankruptcy of Herstatt Bank, which was a significant participant in the foreign 
exchange matters.16 The purpose of the committee is “to enhance financial stability by improving the 
quality of banking supervision worldwide”.17 It can be said that from the beginning of the utilization of 
technology in finance has always entailed a risk. By the time technology has become interlinked with 
financial services, the market risks have tended to be at stake such as: “Black Monday” in 1987, the 
computer technology widely used which led program-based trading popular until the market crash in 
that.18 
 
Even though there was a minimum level of regulations, the exponential growth in the finance sector and 
capital mobility has enabled financial innovation and market deregulation.19 Financial deregulation is 
comprised with ease on the quantity controls and other prohibitions on banks, and as a result, the limits 
on the facilitate activities other than traditional lending diminished.20   
 
2. After the 2008 Global Finance Crisis 
 
                                                 
13 Jame DiBiasio, ICBC chairman welcomes fintech regs, FINANCE ASIA (Aug. 17, 2015), 
http://www.financeasia.com/News/400732,icbc-chairman-welcomes-fintech-regs.aspx. 
14 Arner “The Evolution of FinTech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm.” (n.7) 
15 Ibid 
16History of the Basel Committee and Its Membership (BIS, 2016) https://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm 
accessed 10 July 2019 
17 Ibid 
18Michaela Otýpková. Financial Crisis and Its Impacts on the Stock Market. Acta Oeconomica 
Pragensia (2010), (4)3 http://0-
search.ebscohost.com.serlib0.essex.ac.uk/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.prg.jnlao
p.v2010y2010i4id309p3.11&site=eds-live. 
19 United Nations,“Financial Regulatory Reform After The Crisis Trade And Development Report, 
(2015) https://unctad.org/en/PublicationChapters/tdr2015ch4_en.pdf 
20 Ibid 
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Whilst online banking takes place since the 1980s, considerations on the new regulatory framework 
commenced after ten years of its adoption.21 The time lag was considered as a natural process, which 
enables the development of innovation without stifling it by the unnecessary regulatory process.22 
Meanwhile, the technology is also used for risk management purpose and legal and compliance 
activities. The excessive trust and reliance on information technology (“IT”) and quantitate finance, which 
are used for the assessment of financial products through mathematical models, lead regulators and 
financers to feel overconfidence with these methodologies.23  
 
It is argued that a false sense of security and dependency on these constitutes the origins of the Crisis. 
The light-handed regulatory framework, mostly based on a commitment to free markets and self-
regulation, was not capable of preventing widespread turmoil in late 2008.24 The blasting point of the 
financial sector is occurred by a bloom in the sub-prime mortgages and securitized products and which 
became a global financial crisis.25 In the end, millions of people lost their jobs, and several banks and 
financial institutions either declared bankruptcy or governments took control over.26   
 
As indicated above, the history of finance and technology dates back to years. Nevertheless, the concept 
of today’s fintech has emerged mostly after the Crisis. As a result of Crisis, the rapid innovation in 
financial technologies, the growth of non-traditional financial services has reached their peak. In other 
words, the regulatory framework tightened after the Crisis, in order to provide an adequate level of 
protection, which in turn, restricted the scope of activity of banks and increased compliance costs.27  
 
Following that, the rapid development in technology-enabled the emergence of new players in the 
industry and the growth of which accelerated due to lack of trust on the incumbents. Specifically, big 
techs have interested in serving financial products, with the help of their massive data pool. In detail, 
                                                 
21 Arner “The Evolution of FinTech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm.” (n.7) 
22 Ibid 
23 Jànos Barberis and others, “FinTech, RegTech, and the Reconceptualization of Financial 
Regulation”, (2017). 
37 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 371. 
24 Ibid 
25 Victoria Ivashina and David Scharfstein, “Bank Lending During the Financial Crisis of 2008” (2010) 
97(3) Journal of Financial Economics:319-338. 
26 Ibid 
27 U.N. Report 
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using data and the analysis network structure in their platform enabled them to conduct financial 
services. It is emphasized by a recent report that the confidence and trust in banks are replaced by 
technology firms in the US, such as the level of reliance on Amazon almost doubles that in City Bank, 
with 71% and 37% respectively.28  
 
All of these reasons have created a fertile environment for the growth of new entrant’s fintech services. 
The recent numbers illustrated that global investment in fintech companies reached $111.8B billion in 
2018.29 The growth of fintech can also be revealed with the number of companies as 168 companies 
established in 2008 and the figure reached to 668 in 2015.30 
 
Today’s non-banking services comprise in five major areas: “1) finance and investment, (2) operations 
and risk management, (3) payments and infrastructure, (4) data security and monetization, and (5) 
customer interface”. Over the last few years, alternative financing mechanism such as crowdfunding 
and P2P lending are getting attraction from investors and regulators. Operation and risk management 
have crucial importance for financial institutions, especially if one considers the regulatory change since 
the crisis, and therefore, IT spending by them are at stake. It can be said that payment and infrastructure 
services are the most significant aspect of the fintech landscape.  Particularly, developing countries, 
which tend to have limited access to banking, mostly benefit from payment services. For instance, a 
recent study revealed that 2.2 billion of individual remains unbanked in Africa, Asia, Latin America and 
the Middle East.31 
 
There are several breaking point in the digital finance sector. To begin with, in the 2010s, telecom 
companies commenced payment services which used the Visa, Mastercard and American Express 
networks, and as well as major smartphone manufacturers have also begun to provide contactless 
                                                 
28 Survey Shows Americans Trust Technology Firms More Than Banks and Retailers, LET’S TALK 
PAYMENTS (Jun. 25, 2015), http://letstalkpayments.com/survey-shows-americans-trust-technology-
firms- more-than-banks-and-retailers/. 
29 KPMG, “The Pulse of Fintech 2018 Biannual global analysis of investment in fintech” 
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2019/02/the-pulse-of-fintech-2018.pdf 
30 Deloitte, “Fintech by the numbers Incumbents, startups, investors adapt to maturing ecosystem” 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/tr/Documents/financial-services/dcfs-fintech-by-the-
numbers.pdf 
31 Anikina I.D. and others, “Methodological Aspects of Prioritization of Financial Tools for Stimulation 
of Innovative Activities” (2016) 19(2), European Research Studies Journal 100-112 
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payments through their phones.32 Moreover, digital wallet services such as Google Wallet and Apple 
Pay are provided by Google and Apple, which practically transformed mobile phones into open-loop 
prepaid cards.33   
 
2.2. Types of Fintech Services  
 
It is emphasized that fintech companies are providing wide range of services. Technology enabled 
innovation in financial services has resulted in development of new business models, applications, 
processes and products. The main sectors that fintech is providing services can be divided into three 
categories34: 
 
Sectoral Innovations 
Credit, Deposit and 
Capital-Raising Services 
Payments, Clearing and Settlement 
Services 
Investment Management 
Services 
Crowdfunding Mobile Wallets 
Value Transfer 
Networks 
High-frequency trading 
Lending Marketplaces 
Peer-to-Peer 
Transfers 
FX Wholesale Copy Trading 
Mobile Banks 
Digital Currencies 
Digital Exchange 
Platforms 
E-trading 
Credit Scoring Robo- Advice 
  
As can be seen, there are several sectors in which there are different wide range of products. Due to 
the variety of the fintech services, this part of the chapter is going to study the specific products, which 
have a changed the concept of the sector.  
 
1. Mobile Payment Services 
                                                 
32 David Lee (n.10) 
33 Mark E. Burge, “Apple Pay, Bitcoin, and Consumers: The ABCs of Future Public Payments Law” 
(2016) 67 Hastings L.J. 1493, pg.1493 
34 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Implications of fintech developments for banks and bank 
supervisors” https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d431.pdf 
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Mobile financial services are probably the first activities that have benefited from Information and 
Communication Technologies within the financial industry.35 It should be emphasized that the phrase 
“mobile financial services” is used to cover a wide range of financial services from money services 
(including transfers and payments) to banking-type services (including deposit and borrowing).36 The 
mobile payment services are delivered by two groups of players: the incumbents (banks and card 
companies) and new entrants ( telecoms operators, big-tech firms and technology innovators).37 These 
payment services are facilitated through mobile or digital wallets. A mobile wallet is an application that 
secures transaction like an updated version of a traditional payment card.38  
 
A recent report in the UK illustrated that, in 2018, the cash payments have down from six out of ten to 
three out of ten payments, which is estimated to fall as low as possible in 15 years.39 Following that, the 
debit card transactions officially surpassed the number of cash payments for the first in the year 2017 
and 3.4 million people claimed that they are not using cash in their transactions. 
 
The payment services are one of the most attracted services of financial technologies. Even though 
both incumbents and new entrants are benefiting from technological innovation, differentiation should 
be made between traditional banking institutions’ services and new entrants’ facilities.  In traditional 
payment systems, where banks play a central authority role that authenticates transactions, which does 
not fall into the definition of fintech in a modern sense.  
 
The big-tech companies have mostly been active in payment services; indeed, the payment services 
are the first branch of financial services that these companies are serving.40  It can be said that there 
                                                 
35 Julia S. Cheney, “An Examination Of Mobile Banking And Mobile Payments: Building Adoption As 
Experience Goods?”, FRB of Philadelphia - Payment Cards Center Discussion Paper No. 08-07, 
2008, p.6. 
36 Ibid 
37 N. Delic and A. Vukasinovic, “Mobile payment solution - symbiosis between banks, application 
service providers and mobile network operators,” 3rd International Conference on Information 
Technology: New Generation, Proceedings. Third International Conference on Information 
Technology: New Generation, IEEE Computer Society, 2006, pp. 346-350. 
38 Yonghee Kim and others, “The Adoption of Mobile Payment Services for “Fintech”, International 
Journal of Applied Engineering Research Vol. 11, No 2 
39  UK Payment Markets Summary, https://www.ukfinance.org.uk/system/files/Summary-UK-Payment-
Markets-2018.pdf 
40 Peter Goldfinch, “A global guide to fintech and future payment trends” (Routledge, 2019) pg.  
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are two main big-tech companies, Alipay and PayPal, that provides guaranteed settlement at delivery 
as well as reclaims by buyers are also settled through e-commerce platforms.41 While in some countries 
which has less developed payment systems telecom companies such as M-Pesa are facilitating 
payment services.42 A recent survey illustrates that 90% of the total payments and deposits are 
conducted in Kenya by these telecom companies.43 It should be emphasized that companies like PayPal 
are depended on third-party infrastructure to process and settle payments; on the other hand, 
companies like M-Pesa can process and settle payments in their system.44 Nevertheless, it is a fact that 
both big-tech and mobile network companies are depended on banks. For instance, even the companies 
that do not outsource infrastructure, still need a bank due to enable money inflow and outflow.45 
 
2. CrowdFunding 
 
Crowdfunding has become one of the most attracted financial technology services among others. To 
begin with, crowdfunding can be defined as a method of raising capital by asking a large number of 
people.46 Traditionally, there would have a limited number of options to borrow money such as banks or 
private individuals and these lenders would require collaterals or assess other variables in order to 
minimize the risk. These obstacles in the market have aggregated the growth of digital fund-raising or 
loan services.47 Crowdfunding is a win-win situation for both investors and individuals/entrepreneurs; 
the latter will not be remained under or unbanked; former will earn a profit while the risk is divided into 
others.48 It can be said that the power of the internet has crucial importance as the big data will help to 
receive attention from large masses.49  
 
                                                 
41 BIS, “Big tech in finance: Opportunities and Risks BIS Annual Economic Report 2019” (2019) 
https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2019e3.pdf 
42 Ibid 
43 Lesley Stahl, “The Future of Money” https://www.cbsnews.com/news/future-of-money-kenya-m-
pesa-60-minutes/ (2015) 
44 N Kshetri,. and S. Acharya, “Mobile payments in emerging markets.” (2012) 14(4),  IT Professional, 
9-13. 
45 Ibid.  
46 FCA, What Is Crowdfunding? https://www.ukcfa.org.uk/what-is-crowdfunding/ 
47 Kevin Berg Grell and Others, “Crowdfunding The Corporate Era” ( Elliot and Thompson 2015) 
48 Ibid 
49 Ibid 
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Even though the term of crowdfunding is relatively new, fundraising from a large mass is not. For 
instance, in 1885, the editor of a newspaper initiated fundraising for the repairment of basement of 
Statue of Liberty was funded through the newspaper and in return the name of the contributors were 
published.50 It can be said that the campaign was a crowdfunding pioneer when the speed with money 
raised and the number of donators are taken into consideration.51  
 
There are several types of raising money depending on the type of return to the investor; donation, 
reward, equity and debt crowdfunding. With regard to donation-based crowdfunding, investors will not 
profit from their investments, and even, most of the time, there will not be the return of the principal 
capital.52 Reward-based crowdfunding, contributions are given in the form of pre-purchase of a product 
or service.53 Loan-based Crowdfunding (P2P lending) is a synonym for peer to peer lending. Basically, 
the debt/investment will be paid back to investor with or without a certain interest rate.54 In the Equity-
Based (Investment) crowdfunding, an investor receives shares of a company in exchange for their 
investment. It shares the same risks as traditional equity investment: if the invested company does not 
a make profit, investors will face losing their money.55 For the purpose of this dissertation the focus will 
be on investment-based crowdfunding; specifically, P2P lending cases. The reason for this is that they 
are the most common and risk-bearing types of crowdfunding. It should be stressed that “P2P is more 
for consumption; crowdfunding is more for value creation”  
 
There are three core business models depending on the services provided by both loan-based and 
investment-based crowdfunding platforms: first, conduit platforms which only promoting investment 
opportunities to investors without being participated in fixing the price of these investments or loans; 
second, “the pricing platforms that itself sets the price, but the investor picks underlying loans”; 
                                                 
50 Gary Dushnitsky, “Crowded Room” (2013) 24(3) Business Strategy Review 28-31 
51 Andrea S. Funk, Crowdfunding in China A New Institutional Economics Approach.( 2th edt. Springer 
2019) 
52 Ibid 
53 ASBA, “An Overview of FinTechs: Their Benefits and Risks Association of Supervisors of Banks of 
the Americas 2017” http://www.asbasupervision.com/es/bibl/i-publicaciones-asba/i-2-otros-
reportes/1603-orep24-1/file 
54 Funk (n. 51)  
55 ASBA (n.53) 
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discretionary platforms that itself sets the price and the investor does not involve to the process of 
choosing lender.56 
 
One of the most successful crowdfunding platforms is Kickstarter, which is established in 2009. Just in 
May 2019, the platform received more than “$4 billion in pledges from 16.3 million backers to fund 
445,000”. A project called Coolest Cooler, which is a portable cooling box with other features has 
attracted 62,642 investors, who invested sum of 13,285,226 $ in total.57 
 
In a modern aspect, the first examples of capital raising under crowdfunding platforms were for 
amusement industry – for movies or music – and then SMS companies have benefited.58 The original 
crowdfunding concept involves three or four players: Project İnitiator, Investor and crowdfunding 
platform. In general, a platform lists PI’s projects on its platform and thereby it functions as an 
intermediary which matches PIs with potential investors.59  
 
3. Peer to Peer Lending  
 
P2P lending (loan-based crowdfunding) platforms enable people lend money to individuals or 
businesses in the hope of a financial return in the form of interest payments and a repayment of capital 
over time.60 P2P is the most analogue to banking lending.61 As indicated above, borrowers (especially 
individuals and SME’s) that have difficulties to obtain credit through traditional channels use this 
alternative way of getting money.62  These platforms also manage credit scoring process through the 
accumulated customer data that they poses.63 
 
                                                 
56 FCA, Loan-based (‘peer-to-peer’) and investment-based crowdfunding platforms: Feedback on our 
post-implementation review and proposed changes to the regulatory framework (CP No.18/20, 2018) 
57 David Mashburn, “The Anti-Crowd Pleaser: Fixing the Crowdfund Act’s Hidden Risks and 
Inadequate Remedies”.(2013) 63(1) Emory Law Journal, 127-174 
58 Grell (n.47) 
59 Funk (n.51) 
60 Alex Brill, ‘Peer-to-Peer Lending: Innovative Access to Credit and The Consequences Of Dodd-
Frank’ (2010) 25 Wash L Found L Backgrounder 1, 1. 
61 Pavlo Rubanov and others, ‘analysis of development of alternative finance models depending on the 
regional affiliation of countries’, Business & Economic Horizons. 2019;15(1):90-106 
62 Ibid 
63 Basel Committee (n.34) 
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Lending Club and Zopa are successful examples of lending platforms. It is predicted that the 
marketplace lending will reach $490 billion in 2020.64 While, these platforms increase efficiency, provide 
transparency and reduce costs, there are new risks arose especially fraud risk are mainly associated 
with it.65 The advantages and the disadvantages of peer to peer lending will be discussed in the next 
chapter.  
 
Generally, there may be a significant difference among P2P lending platforms: some platforms do not 
take any credit risk nor hold loans on their balance sheet; others, on the other hand, perform these 
functions, which make their function closer to traditional banking. 66  
 
4. Cryptocurrency  
 
It will not be wrong to categorize blockchain based technologies, especially cryptocurrencies, as the 
most attracted innovation. Blockchain technology basically can be defined as a distributed and 
decentralized public ledger.67 It is worth noting that cryptocurrencies (also referred as “exchange 
tokens”) are sub-class of crypto assets. Cryptoassests can be divided into three sections; exchange 
tokens (cryptocurrencies), security tokens and utility tokens.68 In general, security and utility tokens are 
means of capital raising, which in exchange, give the right to access  to the product or service offered 
by the company or value from an external asset, respectively. Although, this dissertation will focus on 
cryptocurrencies. 
 
Cryptocurrencies can be explained as a transaction is transparently recorded synchronically across an 
automated peer to peer computer network.69 Every transaction is authenticated through a distributed 
process that locks the time, account number and amount for the transaction. Traditionally, a central 
authority is responsible for the safety and security of the transaction, means ensuring that no double 
                                                 
64 Morgan Stanley, “Can P2P Lending Reinvent Banking?”, www.morganstanley.com, 2015 
65 Fabio Caldieraro and others, “Strategic Information Transmission in Peer-to-Peer Lending Markets” 
(2018) 82(2) Journal of Marketing 42-63 
66 David Lee (n.10) pg.393  
67 Blockchain Explained https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/blockchain.asp 
68 Chris Burniske and Jack Tatar, “Cryptoassets : the innovative investor's guide to bitcoin and 
beyond” (McGraw-Hill Education 2018)  
69 Rosario Girasa, “Regulation of Cryptocurrencies and blockchain technologies National and 
International Perspectives”, ( Palgrave Macmillan, 2018) pg. 36 
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spending occurs; whereas, validation of cryptocurrencies can be done by every individual, referred as 
“miners”, who wants to participate to the process.70  
 
In general, every user has a public key and private key: public key can be accessed by anyone which 
procure transparency; private key on the other hand, is a private code which should only be known by 
the holder of it.71 Basically, both payee and payor have a public and private key.72 The payee embeds 
the transactions detail into payor’s public key and then the document is sent to payor who can access it 
with his/her own private key.73 When the transaction is completed among parties, then it waits to be 
confirmed by the minors.74 
 
There is a great benefit to discuss the legal status of cryptocurrencies, which has been a controversial 
issue among scholars.75 There are several possible ways to classify them such as currency, commodity, 
commodity money, or security.76 For instance, in Germany, they are recognized as “unit of account” 
and, therefore, referred to as private money.77 Another example, in Canada, they are treated as 
“commodity” for taxing purposes.78 In the UK, initially cryptocurrencies are classified as “tradable 
voucher,” with which authorities were allowed to impose Value Added Tax (VAT).79 However, the Court 
of Justice of the European Union ruled that they are exempted from VAT.80 After that cryptocurrencies 
are reclassified as “private currency.” 
 
5. Smart Contracts 
 
                                                 
70 Ibid 
71 Paul Vigna and Michael J. Casey, “Cryptocurrency : the future of money” (Vintage, 2016)  
72 Ibid 
73 Mark Andreessen, Why Bitcoin Matters, N.Y. TIMES http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/21/why-
bitcoin-matters. 
74 Ibid 
75 David Lee Kuo Chuen Lee, Linda Low, “Inclusive fintech : blockchain, cryptocurrency and ICO”  
(World Scientific Publishing Co., 2018) 
76 Gareth Pyburn, “Bitcoin Legal: Taxonomy of Regulatory Reactions, APAC’s Outlook and Potential 
for BTC-Linked Derivatives”, Lexology ( 2014), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0eb2ec8e-d7a5-43ab-b177- 617fd0c981f9. 
77 Girasa (n.66)  pg.216 
78 Adam Bata, The Brief on Bitcoins, STEWART MCKELVEY LAW. (Feb. 26, 2014), 
http://stewartmckelveyblogs.com/themedium/2014/02/26/the-brief-on- bitcoins/. 
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Journal of Investment Compliance. 2019 
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While the attention has been on the cryptocurrencies, another blockchain-based innovation is smart 
contracts, which will have a significant impact on the contract law. Smart Contracts are an actual 
contract, just transformed into code.81 The execution of a contract does not require a human 
interference: the computer system itself will execute the terms of the contract.82 An example of 
successful platform, which implementing smart contracts successfully, is Ethereum, an open-source, 
public platform.83 
 
 Briefly, the parties of a smart contract, draft the contract based on what they agree on and then, they 
will sign the contract “cryptographically” and upload it on the blockchain.84 Following that, the execution 
of the contract will be under control of the system itself.85 In other words, whenever the conditions of the 
code of the contract are fulfilled, the relevant action to that condition will be triggered.86  
 
An example for practice of smart contracts and cryptocurrency can be given: where two parties have 
agreed on a renting of the apartment and the details of the contract executed virtually.87 The payment 
can be done by a virtual currency and the receipt of it will be transmitted to the blockchain; in return the 
other part will share a digital key for the house by a specified date.88 Until the payment is done, smart 
contract will not release the key or if the key has not shared at that day, smart contract will not release 
the payment.89 
 
6. Robo Advisor 
 
Technological improvement has also changed the investment products and services. The innovation 
called robo-advisors can be explained as digital platforms which use IT to guide their customers through 
an automated investment advisory which comprised of interactive and intelligent user assistance 
                                                 
81 Quinn DuPont, “Cryptocurrencies and Blockchains”. (Medford, MA: Polity, 2019) pg.173 
82 Andy Robinson and Tom Hingley, 'Smart Contracts: The Next Frontier?' (Oxford Law Faculty, 2016) 
<https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2016/05/smart-contracts-next-frontier> 
83 Girasa (n.66) pg. 39 
84 Institute of International Finance  
85 Fenwick, Mark and Vermeulen, Erik P.M., A Primer on Blockchain, Smart Contracts & Crypto-
Assets Lex Research Topics in Corporate Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2019-3. 
86 Ibid 
87 Girasa (n.66) pg. 40 
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89 Ibid 
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components.90 In other words, the role of human financial advisors is about to cease to exist. In 2019, 
robo-advisors have 1.5 trillion US dollars in asset under management, which is expected to double itself 
in 2020.91  
 
Traditionally, regard to customer assessment, investor profiling requires in-person interview and bilateral 
relations; however these are replaced by online questionnaires as well as customer’s investment aims, 
or their risk limits are identified through algorithms.92  
 
It is emphasized that the target audience of robo-advisor platforms are mostly retail customers or non-
professionals segment due to reduced costs of management expenses.93 Nevertheless, the innovation 
is relatively new, and its risks and benefits are still controversial, which will be discussed in the next 
chapter.   
 
Chapter III. – Upsides, Downsides and Issues for Consideration   
 
It is an apparent fact that financial technology services are reflecting fundamental changes in the finance 
sector, which is very exciting. While the innovations are breath-taking, the point must be analysed 
whether they are pragmatic for the finance industry. In other words, whether the benefits of innovation 
in finance outweigh the risks that it imposes on the sector. In this chapter, both the advantages and 
disadvantages as well as some pinpoints will be analysed.  
 
3.1     Fintech Advantages  
 
                                                 
90 P. Sironi, “FinTech innovation: from robo-advisors to goal based investing and gamification” (Wiley 
2016) pg.8 
91 KPMG, “Robo advising Catching up and getting ahead” 
https://home.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/07/Robo-Advising-Catching-Up-And-Getting-
Ahead.pdf 
92 Dominik Jung and others, “Robo-Advisory” (2018) 60(1) Business & Information Systems 
Engineering 2018,  pp 81–86  
93 Melanie L. Fein, “Robo-Advisors: A Closer Look” (2015) SSRN Working Paper : 
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There are several advantages, in general, that these fintech services will improve the sector: the 
potential of raising efficiency; decreasing fees; advanced access to financial services; diminishing the 
need for a central authority.94  
 
1. Financial Inclusion  
One of the most important features of financial technologies is that it provides greater financial inclusion. 
Financial inclusion means that ensuring access to financial products and services by who are under or 
unbanked groups. 95 All of the above mention fintech services will enhance the financial inclusion, 
nevertheless Crowdfunding, P2P lending and mobile payment services will have the biggest impact. It 
is a fact that financial products have not become useable by large masses. In some circumstances, the 
reason for this is that banks are not well developed and thus, their activity is very limited.96 In other 
cases, some individuals are unbanked due to failing to meet the minimum requirements of banks.97 
Even the ones who can benefit from banks, they have to bear with excessive transaction fees.98  As will 
be explained below, financial technologies will enhance the financial inclusion due to the fact that they 
abolish boundaries and have to comply with fewer regulations, and their operation does not cost 
prohibitive amounts. 
 
Moreover, banks tend to not serve some customers due to information costs as they may lack basic 
documentation. For instance, in developing countries, small and medium enterprises (SME’s) do not 
encounter minimum requirements of banks. Figures are indicating that globally, 38% of adults do not 
have bank accounts and only 40% of them have access to a financial product.99 The P2P lending 
platforms will provide services to these unbanked borrowers by collecting different but necessary 
information through their systems. Two credit provider companies, Ant Financial and Mercado Libre, 
                                                 
94  Working Papers No 655 The FinTech Opportunity by Thomas Philippon 2017 
95Marek Hudon, Marc Labie and Ariane Szafarz, “A research agenda for financial inclusion and 
microfinance” ( Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019) pg.20 
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Working Paper no 723. 
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claimed that their assessment involve more than a thousand data series per loan applicant.100 In general, 
fintech companies will enhance the financial inclusion and help developments of firms.  
 
A similar issue to lending is funding capital for projects or start-ups. Traditionally, fund-raising activity is 
carried out by banks or private investors (angel investment), which requires several risk managements 
and they face regulatory obstacles even they are willing to invest.101 However financial technology can 
ease the accessibility with several aspects: First, the unfunded projects or start-ups can easily raise 
money from various investors through crowdfunding platforms; second, the risk is mitigated among wide 
range of customers under these platforms.102 In traditional sense, risk is undertaken mostly by single 
entity or individual; yet online platforms attract multiple investors for a single project or investors can 
divide their investments into more than one projects.103 
 
The financial inclusion will also improve traditional banking.104 Individuals or companies used to have 
fewer options regarding to financial services; which in turn, cause over permissiveness in the banking 
system wherein the quality of services is inattentive, or transaction fees are excessive. However, new 
entrants to the system will push banks to provide better service or they will lose customers. 
 
Moreover, digital finance services have a potential to boost the gross domestic product (“GDP”) by 
enabling to easy access to wide range of financial products and services for individuals and small and 
medium enterprises.105 In other words, increased financial inclusion will increase average expenditure, 
which will correlatively effect GDP.  
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2. Reducing Costs and Increasing Efficiency  
Traditional business structures are depended on a close relationship with customers, which requires 
excessive time and labour force.106 These structures are now facing a challenge by inexpensive services 
of new fintech companies, which are based upon the collective intelligence of crowd through 
sophisticated data analytics. 107 
 
Fintech has a direct effect on traditional banking services. The competition between banks and fintech 
companies are getting exacerbated every year because of the rapid growth of the innovation.108 Banks, 
therefore, compelled to facilitate technology backed modern service and to reduce the unreasonable 
transaction costs in order to maintain and strengthen their role in the financial sector.109 It is argued by 
some that there is not a considerable cost difference between them, means that non-traditional financial 
services are slightly lower costs than the traditional one.110 Nevertheless, the combination of this feature 
with the deduced lengthy process of waiting to obtain service is making new entrants appealing from 
customers.111 For instance, getting a loan in the traditional system will take weeks or month, by saying 
that it is not possible to go to a bank and receive a loan at the very same day.112 
 
One of the innovations fintech brought to finance industry is that it benefits from big data, which can be 
used to anticipate customer behaviour, as well as creating strategies and protection policies.113 In detail, 
big data will improve the risk management and operational efficiency. The behaviour of customers can 
be observed easily with the help of big data, which in turn, will enhance the service quality.114 The 
products launched to the market will be more tailored to customer’s need.115 
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Utilization of smart contracts will increase efficiency and reduce costs.116 For instance, in trade, the 
execution of letters of credits are intermediated by banks and that is why execution of it requires human-
driven processing and verification, which amount to excessive time consumption and excessive costs.117 
However, smart contracts function automatically based on pre-arranged terms which in turn will increase 
speed in execution of contracts and reduce costs. Nevertheless, it is argued that in practice the costs 
will not diminish; there will be other expenses inherent in smart contacts. (infra pp. 30) 
 
With regard to crowdfunding services, big tech companies have considerable advantages compared to 
banks. In the conventional banking system, to price loans, banks have to evaluate the riskiness of their 
customers by collecting information from several sources.118 It is underlined that the cost of enforcing 
loan payments covers a significant place in total financial intermediation cost.119 The way that banks 
secure the reimbursement of the loan  is to monitor customers constantly or require collateral from 
customers.120 This conventional method is expensive and time-consuming, and banks compensate 
these expenses through their customers in the form of fees or interest rates. On the other hand, the 
usage of big data, by digital finance companies, for monitoring activities of customers reduce the 
mentioned costs and develop efficiency. Furthermore, it is possible to pair high risk borrowers with profit 
seeking investors or low risk borrowers with a risk-averse investor, with the help of algorithms.121 
 
A significant advantage of fintech services compared to traditional banking is that they diminish the 
geographic barriers. In general, all fintech products provide service regardless the distance between 
customers and entrepreneurs.  With regard to payment services, transaction across boundaries or the 
necessity to be in a bank, have been eliminated through e-wallets.122 As well as regarding to 
crowdfunding platforms, it is illustrated that the average distance between investor and borrower is 
almost 5,000 km in SellaBand platform.123 
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3. Greater Transparency  
Traditional banking facilities provide transparency to a certain level, most of the time they reveal a 
minimum amount of information. 124 On the contrary, fintech services provide greater transparency; 
which, in turn, improve the work of regulators as they have a clear perspective about financial stability.  
125 Besides, transparency may induce a regulatory advantage for the fintech companies: where 
regulators able to monitor activities, by which they can assess whether the activities of fintech 
companies poses a risk to the financial system, and regulators will not be under the strain of regulating 
as long as the risk is not at stake.126 
 
Another innovation that provides greater transparency is blockchain technologies, especially in 
cryptocurrencies that provide transparent ledger of transaction information.127 First of all, it is possible 
to track every single transaction concluded in a blockchain service.128 For instance, the transparency of 
blockchain technology may have a crucial impact on our daily life by providing supply chain 
transparency.129 In detail, what we eat is a significant concern for us: it is not explicit at the moment that 
under which conditions the food we eat is produced.130 Interacting blockchain into supply chain circle 
will enable trackability.131 However, in practice it is argued that authorities had difficulties to track illicit 
activities, which will be studied under theft.132 (Infra pp. 34) 
 
3.2.   Fintech Disadvantages  
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Financial technologies, as explained above, are of benefit to the sector as reducing cost, greater 
transparency, reduced error. However, these appealing advantages come with a cost as they are 
accompanied by new risks and issues to be solved before it imposes exponential harm on the finance 
sector and individuals. It may be argued that the volume of fintech services does not cover a significant 
proportion in all finance market, which is a deceptive opinion. Especially, if one considers that it has not 
been much 2008 global financial crisis. The point of the matter is that the finance sector is a highly 
connected sector and default in one aspect could affect the integrity of all system. 133 The fintech 
services, which is rapidly developing, are connecting with the rest of the sector day by day. 
 
Thus, the risks or disadvantages of fintech should be analysed carefully. There are several issues that 
fintech may impose a significant risk in the finance sector.  This chapter will study the main risks of the 
fintech, such as legal concerns, data security, theft, cybercrime, third-party reliance, macro financial 
exposure. Identification of these risks has a crucial when considering whether the benefits of fintech 
outweighs the risks. This chapter is going to analyse these risks and will try to deliver a solution. 
 
1) Legal Risks  
 
One of the main concerns has been arising with the rapid growth of the digital financial services is that 
the position of them in the legal framework. The utilization rate of the technological innovations in the 
finance sector is at an unprecedented scale and thus, the financial sector is more under risk with more 
individuals and businesses benefit from it. As explained above, the 2008 financial crisis unfolded the 
fact that development in unmonitored or unregulated environments can have destructive 
consequences.134  
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With regard to crowdfunding, P2P lending and mobile payment services, regulatory uncertainty, in 
general, may affect consumer protection, financial stability and financial integrity.135 There is a potential 
risk that incumbents and new entrants will want to turn regulatory uncertainty into an opportunity by 
seeking large profits in the short term, which can affect financial stability.136  How fintech should be 
regulated  is going to be analysed in the next chapter. 
 
Even if the national authorities are come up with a tailored regulatory framework for their country, the 
regulatory arbitrage risk is at stake.137 It can be defined as taking advantage of the lack of 
standardization of regulations around the world. In other words, digital finance companies can be 
incorporated in a region, where the requirements for these services are minimum, and then, they provide 
services in the highly regulated regions.138 Therefore, there is a greater potential that financial stability 
is at hazard. The solution is lies behind the harmonization and unification of regulation of fintech in a 
global sense, which can be achieved through international agreements. 
 
With regard to smart contracts, the issue is the uncertainty of the applicable law of the contract.139 The 
blockchain technology renders possible a contract to be concluded under a large number of 
jurisdictions.140 In the case of a dispute due to the interpretation of a smart contract, the issue is which 
law is applicable to the contract in order to determine the legality of the contract.141 The classic contract 
law approach may be taken to resolve this issue: the first consideration is the party autonomy, whether 
there is an explicit choice of law; if not then the closest connection and characteristic performance can 
be taken into account; protection of weaker party can be prioritised.142  
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Besides, smart contracts are drafted in the form of codes, which constitutes another problem.143 At the 
moment, most of the lawyers do not know how to code, in turn, these contracts are going to be prepared 
by computer programmers. In this sense there two legal issues: first, to what extent it is wise to let non-
law graduates allow draft a contract; second, where there is a conflict with the algorithms, whether 
programmers will be responsible. 144 Furthermore, it is emphasized that smart contracts will reduce 
expenses like lawyer fees. However, this expense, in reality, will be shifted to the drafting process.145  
 
2) Data Security  
 
Technology-driven innovation in the banking sector and the emergence of new fintech companies 
enabled more data to be digitalised. With the help of digitalisation, it is possible to track and collect every 
bit of datum, and the accumulated data (which is often referred as “big data”) are used to anticipate 
customer behaviours.146 Data has become the most important commodity, as its value exceeds the 
value of money.147 It plays a key role in the financial sector as it has a direct effect on the profitability of 
services like lending, insurance and payment services.148 In detail, the complex algorithms are being 
used to process or analyse  details requested by the customer and transform them into tailored 
products.149  
 
Furthermore, the bigtech companies have become “data-opolies” or “digital monopolies”.150 The concept 
of “digital monopolies” can be explained as “too big, anti-competitive, addictive and destructive to 
democracy”.151 Automated data process could lead to discrimination as algorithms are used to find 
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pattern  in large datasets and a biased algorithm would create unfair results.152 For instance big data 
can help to identify low credit individuals and these groups may be prevented to from seeing loan 
advertisements.153 
 
A relevant example which can be given is data collection on the Facebook.154 The tech giant, which also 
owns Instagram and WhatApp, forces its users to give consent to the unrestricted collection of personal 
data by third parties or its subsidiaries.155 These accumulated data are either sold to the others or are 
used to sell ads.156 Following that, there were more serious allegations about the misuse of personal 
data, the Cambridge Analytica scandal.157 It was alleged that Facebook sold its customers’ personal 
data to this company, by whom the data was used to influence voters among nations. 158 In detail, the 
company had access to 50 million users of Facebook and their data was used against their selves by 
simply imposing on them political ads in order to confuse them or even change their political opinions.159  
 
Nevertheless, the authorities have become aware of the risks and regulations have been enacted such 
as General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which secures data privacy in the UK.160 Personal data 
is defined as “any information related to an identified or identifiable (living) natural person (‘data 
subject’)”.161 Under this regulation, in order to collect and process personal data, the data subject has 
to be clearly informed about the purpose of the process and has given consent to the processing of his 
or her personal.162 It is underlined that all kind of loud computing providers are required to provide 
technical and organisational measures.163 As well as there are foreseen measurements regarding to 
automated data processing.  
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If fintech and bigtech are not comply with these requirements and measurements, they will be fined.  
For instance, European Commission fined Google by €4.34 billion.164 As well as, Facebook165 has been 
fined several times by different authorities; however, the question which must be answered is whether 
these monetary sanctions are deterrent enough to discourage these companies. In other words, the 
question is whether the companies are willing continue the desired activity (and take the risk of being 
fined) due to the fact that what they gain with misuse of individual’s data  may be a big amount compared 
to the fine they will have to pay, if caught. 
 
3) Theft and Fraud 
 
. Online thefts, can be achieved much more conveniently by hackers, without the need to be physically 
there. Financial technologies are one of the main areas of fraudulence activities, which can be broadly 
defined as deception to obtain unfair and unlawful gains through these channels.166  Ponzi schemes, 
advanced-fee frauds, identity theft, and phishing schemes are common ways to defraud individuals. 
 
A recent report illustrated that fraudsters are able to open bank accounts under innocent people’s 
name.167 For instance, the fraudsters create fake websites which are identical to regular job application 
websites, and when a job applicant is filling an ordinary “applicant form” and providing personal data, 
they actually may find themselves in the middle of the bank account opening process.168 With this 
method, even if an unlawful transaction can be detected by authorities, the possibility of  finding the real 
identity of the fraudsters decreases.  
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Specifically, concerns have arisen about the new entrants, since their cybersecurity system are not as 
developed as banks.169 An example that justifies these concerns is on cryptocurrency models.170 
According to a recent report, just in the first half of 2019, 1.2 billions of dollars’ worth cryptocurrency was 
stolen. 171 This figure is almost equivalent to the total amount of other thefts that happened in 2018, 
which amounted to 1.7 billion dollars.172 Cryptocurrency risks are mostly arising in areas due to where 
private keys of cryptocurrencies are stored such as wallets or the platforms where exchange 
transactions occur.173 One of the most prompted features of cryptocurrencies is that the public ledger 
technology known as blockchain, which enables greater transparency.174 However, the authorities or 
individuals have not been able to track these thefts, which creates confusion with so-called greater 
transparency feature.175 
 
The recent fraud scandals mostly happened in lending platforms such as crowdfunding online 
platforms.176 There are two potential risks which may arise from both lending platform itself and 
borrowers. 177 With regard to former one, platform administrators may embezzle the raised money.178 
On the other hand, borrowers may conceal their identity. Most of the lending platforms are dealing 
sensitively with verifying borrowers’ identities, occupations and incomes; yet this process is mostly 
human driven and thus, the process is widely open to errors.179 There is a great benefit to mention 
Enzubao’s, a rogue P2P lending platform.180 The platform attracted investors through advertising fake 
projects and managed to draw US $7.6 billion from about 900,000 investors.181 
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4) Anti-Money Laundering  
 
The positive impacts of financial technologies on finance sector have been accompanied with new risks. 
Especially, the risk of money laundering (AML) and Counter Terrorist Financing (CTF) activities have 
been enhanced through these products.182 The main reason for this is that monitoring fintech activities 
has become more exhausting due to the fact that innovation rapidly and with acceleration increased the 
number of people who can access financial products, which made it harder to track every single 
transaction. Transactions can be conducted through anonymous channels.183 Following that some of 
the services of digital finance platforms may fall outside the scope of the current scheme of Anti-Money 
Laundering (AML) and Counter-Terrorist Financing (CTF) regulations.184 This vulnerability arises mainly 
from blockchain-based cryptocurrencies.185 As mentioned above, it is challenging to track money flow 
and even if he suspicious accounts are determinable by authorities, the risk of constant newly opened 
accounts are remains.186  
 
5) Third-Party Reliance 
 
Both incumbents and new entrants’ financial products do not cover an end-to-end service: service of a 
single product is conveyed through involvement of multiple parties. The activity of key operations such 
as data provision, cloud storage and analytics, and physical connectivity are dependent on third-party 
providers.187 It is estimated that the reliance of incumbents or fintech companies on them will increase 
with the development of technology, which in turn will create new risks.188 The process of collaboration 
of banks with new entrants or with the outsourcing services of third parties tends to expose the 
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customers’ data. 189 Another main concerns in this scenario is that the increasing number of incumbents 
and new entrants are currently benefiting from a small number of service providers, which imposes an 
operational risk. In other words, third-party services play a very centralized role in the operation of 
financial products. In the case of a failure of these services, financial industry will be paralyzed. A 
relevant example to this is the crash of Amazon cloud services.190 There are several companies and 
institutions such as Apple which are using the Amazon Cloud service and the technical disruption, which 
lasted more than three hours, have affected not only Amazon but also these other players.191 Another 
example can be given is  for lending platforms or robo-advisors, which are operating through 
assessment of data.192 Where third-party data providers are highly concentrated, the misuse of data 
would not only affect a single platform but also would have an accumulating effect on the financial sector 
in general.193  
 
With regard to fintech payment providers, utilities such as Apple Pay or Google Pay, have brought new 
potential fraud risks.194 It is argued that these payment providers provide “front to end” business 
operations.195 This operation method means that fintech payment platforms only deals directly with the 
customers, while the rest of the procedure is handled by the other service providers which also work 
with third parties.196 When a customer benefits from a fintech service, actually, their data is actually 
directed to multiple platforms, which increases the possibility of fraud.197 Moreover, it is emphasized that 
increasing the number of participants to the service is also it makes difficult to track the ex-ante 
investment, when a fraud occurs.198 
 
6) Liquidity and Mismatch Risk 
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The rapid development in the technology and increasing number of platforms enables customers to 
change between different saving accounts to obtain better returns.199 This can improve efficiency; yet 
there may adverse effects, which may have a impact on the financial stability.200 Easy access to various 
services can affect customer loyalty and increase the volatility of deposits which, in turn, may create 
liquidity risk.201 Furthermore, equity investments are illiquid, which means that the investments cannot 
be monetized until the fintech company makes profit.202 With regard to cryptocurrencies, their 
acceptance is limited to a few platforms and thus, liquidation issues may arise. For instance, Ethereum, 
a cryptocurrency, incident unrolled the liquidity concerns.203 What happened is that a single high volume 
sell and the following transactions created liquidity problem in the market, and as a result, Ethereum’s 
market price hit the bottom.204 Nevertheless, it is emphasized that most of the current fintech services 
such as lending platforms or payment services do not involve holding customer deposits.205  
 
Maturity mismatch risk can typically be seen in lending services.206 Basically, where an investor invests 
money on three years and that investment may be matched with a five years loan or pre-maturity sell 
out options may create a future maturity mismatch which will affect financial stability.207 
 
7) Macro Financial Risks 
 
On the other hand, macro-financial risks can be described as the risks which can have an impact on the 
wider financial system, and thus, financial stability may be affected more than micro financial risks. 
Following that, even though macro financial risks are not at stake, certain innovations have potential to 
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create these risks. Macro-financial risks can be listed as contagion, pro-cyclicality, excess volatility and 
systematic importance. 
Contagion 
Contagion is defined as a distress experienced by a single institution or a sector, which may be inflected 
to the others due to the relationship between them.208 As in 2008 Crisis reputational contagion, which 
is, for instance, an unexpected loss in one lending platform may be interpreted possible losses across 
the sector.209  Likewise, if a significant and uncalculated loss occurs in a single highly repudated fintech 
platform, this may  trigger all sectoral effect. 
Pro-Cyclicality 
Likewise, fintech activities could cause procyclical dynamics as the algorithms of robo-advisers can be 
similar and this could lead herding behaviour, which would cause larger swings in sentiment.210 
 
Chapter IV. – How Fintech Services should be regulated  
 
In the previous chapter the opportunities and the risks of digital financial services were discussed along 
with it’s the legal issues. A significant question to consider is whether these services should be regulated 
and if yes, the next step is determining how they should be regulated. 10 years ago, this question would 
not be a crucial consideration for financiers and lawmakers, nevertheless, the key players of industry 
have erred on the side of caution due to the Crisis. Before the Crisis in 2008, the attitude of lawmakers 
towards financial innovations by law-makers was mostly constructive as the regulations were not 
strict.211 After the crisis, the affirmative approach to innovation in finance has been changed with the 
adoption of stricter regulations.212  Although law makers must accept this rapid development in the 
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fintech industry and take into account the urge to re-start economic expansion and to foster financial 
inclusion.213 These factors put pressure on regulators to promote innovation in digital finance services.214  
 
4.1. Possible Approaches to regulate  
 
As indicated so far, the question regarding the most convenient regulatory approach to development of 
digital finance revolve around the issue of whether regulate it in advance or let innovation progress and 
then, if appropriate, regulate.215 There are possible ways to regulate activities of digital financial services; 
laissez-faire (doing nothing), case by case basis, structured experimentalism and adoption of new 
regulatory frameworks.  
 
1.  Regulating by doing nothing  
 
It is not a coincidence that innovation occurs under supportive authorities.216 The adoption of specific 
regulations can be a deterring factor for innovation even under less strict rules.217 For this reason, it is 
argued that fintech activities should not be regulated to provide opportunity its growth. This approach is 
also called as “laissez-faire”. 
 
The purpose of the laissez-faire approach is to give space to fintech development, however, to which 
extent the activities of fintech companies fall into the current regulatory framework has crucial 
importance. The reason for this is that if the strict rules of the current banking industry apply to fintech 
services, then, it will not make sense not to regulate their activity. For instance, it is argued that the strict 
rules regarding to personal data protection may put back or slow the development of fintech business 
development.218 In this sense, not regulating approach will constitute a barrier towards development. It 
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is expected that the Financial Stability Board and the national regulatory authorities will ease the 
regulatory obstacles and to improve data harmonization. 219 
 
A relevant example can be given in the EU: according to a survey 18% of the current payment services 
companies are subjected to the Payment Services Directive (PSD Directive); 11% of the investment 
firms are subjected to Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID); 6.5% of the electronic money 
institutions are subjected to E-Money Directive (EMD)220. As can be seen, a small proportion of fintech 
companies are subjected to the current EU regulatory frame and as a result, the fintech sector has been 
developing rapidly. The global value of Fintech investment was less than a billion dollars in 2010, then 
which reached 26 billion US dollars in 2018.221 It is underlined that there are no risks at stake due to 
fintech activities that would affect financial stability.222 The figures are indicating that there is no reason 
regulators to take action. 
 
Furthermore, imposing strict rules amounts to increased expenses on regulatory compliance.223 For 
example, Basel Rules adopted after the Crisis, which imposed multiple requirements on the sector and 
as a result of these, the costs of bank facilities have increased.224 Therefore, imposing strict regulations, 
will cause these services to lose the attraction, which, in turn will decrease the rapid innovation and 
cause less threat to the conventional system.225 According to the recent survey in which 18 variables 
are considered, there is an inverse correlation between the amount of investment on fintech companies 
and stringent regulations.226 
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Another rational reason why the laissez-faire approach can be well-suited is that it may be unnecessary 
to regulate financial technologies for now. That is to say, these services have not a significant effect on 
the industry at the moment, so it may be forgotten in years and thus the efforts that have been shown 
now can be a waste of time.227 For example, in both the United States and the United Kingdom, the e-
banking services were commenced in the ‘80s but stopped shortly after.228 If the regulators in these 
countries have bustled with regulations, they would have spent time for a thing that ceased to exist in 
the medium term. Moreover, the precautions that are taken now can miss out on the outcomes of these 
services.  In other words, allowing innovations to develop and then, to find its final use would be more 
logical. The regulators, at that future time, will have a clearer perspective regarding the risks, benefits, 
application area.229 Thus, it is suggested that the regulators should remain technology natural and 
concentrate on the outcomes.230  
 
Many countries pursue laissez-faire approach.231 One of the successful examples of this approach can 
be seen in China.232 Chinese companies  have reached to “too big to fail” from too-small to care” within 
months.233 Whereas, this approach is not advisable where the fintech activities have reached a 
remarkable amount of funds or number of customers. That is why China has changed its line of conduct 
when they realised that the market volume has reached 225 billion dollars.234 In other words, while 
regulators are staying technology-neutral towards innovation the fintech industry could cause a financial 
crisis and it may impose irreversible risks on the finance sector. 235 
 
2. Case by Case Approach 
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It can be said that it is not always practical and rational to do nothing or impose strict regulations. The 
principle of case by case approach can be explained as; newly established fintech companies will enjoy 
gradual growth through tailored regulations as they carefully peruse customers’ financial position, 
objectives and risk appetites.236 In this sense, if Fintech companies fulfil the required minimum 
obligations, it would be unreasonable to impose rigorous measures as imposed on banks. In order to 
create a balanced growth in financial technologies, subjective regulations or specific permits can be 
used. This balanced growth can be enabled by regulatory forbearance (such as no-action letters), 
restricted licences or special charters.237 The fintech companies, with these incentives, will conduct 
activities without being subject to some rules which are considered as unnecessary to impose on 
them.238 The outcome of no-action letters, restricted licensing or special charters can be ensured by 
partial exemptions or dispensation.  
 
A relevant example that would illustrate the benefit of the case by case approach can be given through 
crowdfunding.  In a case called Zopa, Italian supervisory authority held that “transferring the same from 
lenders to borrowers, gave rise to the receipt of repayable funds from the public, as such prohibited to 
undertakings other than banks under Italian banking law”.239  The decision raised some concerns: first, 
loan-based crowdfunding platforms do not lend money directly, they only provide loans amongst their 
customers; secondly, such regulations are formed for banking firms, which undertake the risk of using 
public funds in their loans and they have a significant impact on liquidity formation and monetary 
policy.240  In this sense extending the banking regulations to these platforms would be unreasonable.  
Instead, law-makers should come up with specific measures tailored to its peculiar features and risks.  
With the restricted licences, P2P online platforms can operate in these areas under certain rules. 
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With regard to no-action letter, an example can be given in the United States, which was issued by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).241 No-action letters enable fintech companies to operate 
in the areas where are highly regulated, provided that the requirements outlined in the no-action letters 
are fulfilled. A company called TurnKey, which sells blockchain-based digital assets in the form of 
“tokenized” jet cards, is qualified for a no-action letter.242 Briefly, this practice of the company would be 
falling into the category of securities (without the issuance of the no-action letter) which is highly 
regulated in the States. Some of the restrictions imposed by the letter can be summarised: token-
generated funds cannot be used to develop the company’s platform technology; the tokens can only be 
used for air charter services.243  
 
Following that also in the US, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) announced that non-
depository fintech companies can apply for national bank charters, which allows them to facilitate 
banking services.244 It is stated that every application will be evaluated on its unique facts and 
circumstances.245 In detail, this will allow non-depository fintech companies, which will become a special 
charter bank, to engage core banking activities with similar rules as banks. 246 They do not, however, 
have to abide by stricter regulations of deposit banking and also they would not have to be insured by 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).247  Nevertheless, there are a considerable amount 
of individuals and institutions who are opposed to this exception, especially due to the insurance 
exemption. For that matter, there is a lawsuit filed in New York, which discussed whether OCC permitting 
fintech companies to engage in the “business of banking” exceeds the authority of itself.248 The judge 
held that only depositing banks can facilitate the business of banking.249  
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It should be analysed whether the benefits of this approach outweigh the risks. To begin with, the close 
relationship between regulators and financial technology services enables information flow between 
them. Therefore, based on this valuable information, tailored regulations will be more efficient as certain 
obligations are going to help to minimize the uncertainty and the risk.250 At the same time, the 
implementation of unnecessary and unreasonable rules will be curbed.   
 
On the other hand, the benefits of per-case approach come with a cost. At first, this approach may be 
advantageous, although the number of companies will increase by time. Thus, there will be more 
requisite for the labour force to ensure adequate treatment and as a consequence, the cost for each 
case. Besides, these companies may not be monitored adequately.  
 
3. Structured Experimentalism  
 
It can be said that structured experimentalism method is the rising trend among other approaches. There 
are several examples of this approach, such as sandbox umbrella, regulatory sandbox and innovation 
hub. Although, this essay will focus on the regulatory sandbox, which is the most common example in 
practice. Before start analysing, regulatory sandboxes, at a general level, involves case by case 
practices. In fact, the both provides privilege for fintech companies, nevertheless, this approach enables 
more systematic environment, in which all entrants can be assessed, rather than one by one.251 
 
There is a great benefit to explain what a regulatory sandbox is in order to provide a comprehensive 
understanding. As known by all, a sandbox is a safe ground for kids to play, ensuring minimum risk for 
them. Hence, in the finance industry, a regulatory sandbox is testing grounds for new business models 
that are not protected by current regulation or supervised by regulatory institutions.252 The purpose of 
these sandboxes is to create an environment, where players can test their products with minimum risk 
of violating laws while adopting appropriate safeguards.253 The objective of sandboxes is generally 
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defined as to support innovation, market development and competition and to enable economic 
growth.254 
 
In general, the procedure commences with the application of a company, which has to fulfil the pre-
defined entry requirements.255 Then, it can facilitate in the sandbox, for a certain duration and field of 
application. The first regulatory sandbox was commenced in the UK in 2015 and there were, at the 
beginning of 2018, more than 20 countries which had already started to adopt this system.256 In 2019,  
29 businesses have been accepted to participate in the sandbox  out of 99 applicants, which is the 
highest number that ever applied for the sandboxes.257 The result of this experiment would be of benefit 
to industry as the flaws of the system will come to light, without imposing a significant risk. When testing 
phase is succeeded, then, the company is being obligated to comply with financial regulation.258 One of 
the most common results of it is either fully-fledged or tailored authorization can be given to the 
companies or, in rare cases, the regulatory framework may be amended based on the outcomes.259 
 
An example can be given to provide a clearity. It is noted that it could be convenient to test a Robo-
advisor company in a regulatory sandbox environment260.  The product will be available to a limited 
number of people and it will only provide advice to its customers.261 Before the execution of the advice, 
when the algorithm issues it, human financial advisors will evaluate the advice.262 As a result, the advice 
of Robo-advisor will not create a negative impact on the customer and the accuracy of the advice can 
be compared with human assessment. 
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The prerequisites for entry into the sandbox differ in every jurisdiction. It can be, nevertheless, said that 
there are common features of these preconditions; contribute to the financial services industry; generate 
solutions to existing or feature complications; enable genuine innovation; be of avail to customers.263  
 
First, there may be a sectoral limitation on the sandbox, the meaning which is that some jurisdictions 
limit the sandbox’s scope to certain sectors. It could be imposed that the regulatory sandbox is only 
eligible for crowdfunding platforms or payment services. While other jurisdictions may limit the type of 
participants as some sandboxes can only accept incumbents, others only start-ups.264  Moreover, the 
lifespan and the size of the sandbox may be limited. In general, the life span of it varies between 6 
months and 24 months.265 
 
Despite these limitations, it is argued that standardized and publicized eligibility will improve cost 
efficiency and resource efficiency.266  As well as, they will reduce the risk that a regulatory sandbox 
imposes on the finance sector.267 For instance, in Switzerland, there is no time limitation for fintech 
companies to play in the sandbox, provided that the collection of monies  does not exceed 1 million 
Swiss francs.268 
 
There are several advantages of sandboxes. Firstly, it will reduce the time to market at a potentially 
lower cost.269 Time to market is a term for the period of time from a product being conceived to its being 
available for the sale.270 It is stated that regulatory uncertainty deters entrepreneurs due to the fact that 
it increases the time span of a product to be finalised.271 A comparative example can be given in the 
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UK’s medical technology.272 It is observed that when the period for a medical innovation to be ready for 
sale takes a longer time, there is a loss expected lifetime product revenues.273 In this sense, a regulatory 
sandbox will decrease the time to market for a fintech service, which would cut down the cost of the 
product. 
 
Moreover, there will be open and fluent communication between regulators and fintech companies. The 
reason is that the companies would not have the fear of losing their licences.274 In a traditional sense, 
companies may cover work with good conduct in order to build a positive image to the authorities. 
Without the fear of losing their licence, the companies would be honest with the figures, which would 
foster improvement. 
 
A concern on regulatory sandboxes is that the process is still human-driven, and the current sandboxes 
are not scalable.275 There are approximately 25 participants of UK sandbox, which is one of the leading 
one in the world; yet, when the total number of licensed market participants is considered, the fintech 
companies’ volume is insignificant. That is to say, it will be challenging to monitor the activities in the 
sandbox as the number of participants increase. Thus, the system has to be developed in a way such 
that it operates more fully automated. 
 
One of the biggest critiques on regulatory sandboxes is that it creates an illusion that appeals to 
customers as a safe environment for who considers investing on fintech companies.276 For instance, 
FCA publishes a list that they have accepted companies into the sandbox, and as a result, investors or 
customers may suppose that these companies are reliable.277 However, regulatory sandboxes are just 
testing environments for the companies, which does not amount to a stamp of approval.278 
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A risk-taking aspect of the regulatory sandboxes is that every jurisdiction establishes their practice and 
this, amounts to a lack of standardization across borders. Nevertheless, in practice, this is not an 
insurmountable problem. The potential to deliver financially stable practice can be achieved by a multi-
jurisdictional sandbox, which can provide shared testing products.279 This can, therefore, reduce the risk 
of regulatory arbitrage across individual sandbox jurisdictions.280 
 
4. Specific Regulations  
 
The last approach is regulating by specific regulations, which can be categorised as the opposite of the 
laissez-faire approach. In other words, existing regulations can be amended, or new regulations can be 
developed.281 This approach is also called as “rule-based regime”.282It is stated that many jurisdictions 
such as the US have developed and enacted a new legislative framework to create a secure 
environment for fintech innovations.283 The jurisdictions that have taken measures mostly regulated the 
areas such as crowdfunding, digital payments or P2P lending activities.284 
 
It is not a surprise that building specific regulations can weaken innovative firms desire to innovate.285 If 
the scope of activity of these firms strictly regulated, the profit margin will drop and therefore, they will 
not be enthusiastic towards innovation. For instance, in the USA, P2P lending activities are regulated 
under US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), even though they do not constitute securities.286 
This mis-regulation makes P2P lending more expensive for customers and therefore threatens its 
existence.287 Even if authorities prefer to impose specific regulations to fintech activities, it is of crucial 
importance that in coming up with tailored regulations and therefore, there is a need to understand 
underlying conceptual framework of the service type. 
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 On the other hand, even though specific regulations come with accost, they will attract investors due to 
its relative certainty and predictability.288 The rules will set boundaries as they will stipulate in detail what 
firms can do and cannot do.289 This will, correctively, a create more stable environment for companies, 
meaning which there will be no room for surprises. According to a report, well-established rules do not 
always repel firms, on the contrary, it is observed that robust rules attract them.290 
 
The benefits of strict regulations can be observed in P2P lending services. It is underlined that P2P 
lending services are one of the least regulated sectors and the reason for this is that they impose a risk 
on the system.291 The light supervisory oversight resulted in bloom in this sector, which was followed by 
a series of scams. The latest numbers showed that $59 billion were taken from the investors due to lack 
of monitoring and legislations.292 It can be said that the question on which type of regulatory approach 
is better for financial technologies also depends on what the subject matter of the regulation is. If 
cybersecurity is the concern, it should be strictly regulated.293 Following this, with regard to peer to peer 
lending services, the scope of their regulation should be depended on their activity. Where a P2P 
platform has discretion in choosing potential borrowers for their clients, they should be regulated as 
portfolio managers.294 As well as, if a platform accepts deposits without resorting to a third-party 
payment provider, it should be subjected to payment subject regulations.295 
 
It is underlined that while specific rules will provide certainty and predictability, they can evade the 
underlying purposes. The financial technologies still relatively new sector and its outcomes and effects 
to the industry may not be foreseen. Just the fact that there are well-established rules in existence does 
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not guarantee compliance. Regulators still may not monitor or there may not be a high-level of 
communication between regulators296   
 
A successful legislation example can be seen within the European Union. The Payment Services 
Directive (PSD) is amended, which enables smoother and safer payment services.297 One of the most 
prominent features of it is that PSD2 mandates banks to share some of the customer data with non-
banking licensed providers.298 The amended directive redresses the balance by supporting innovation 
and securing stability. The same approach can be seen in Australia, the legislation called “consumer 
data right” is introduced. Starting with the banks, the customer data has to be shared with other, provided 
that consent of the customers.299 It can be said that regulations are not always beneficial just for financial 
stability; they can also be used to support innovation.  
 
5. Comparison 
Throughout this chapter, possible approaches to regulate fintech were analysed. Each approach has its 
own merits, nevertheless, it will not be practical to adopt just one of the approaches by itself. As 
indicated, regulators should aim the balance between promoting innovation, and financial stability, and 
consumer protection. 
In order to redress the balance, the reasoning behind the rules must be well understood.300 These are: 
digital finance must contribute to efficient allocation of resources; it must not cause abrupt price 
fluctuations; the protection of customers and investors must be ensured; fair competition must be 
provided; the balance between government supervision and industry self-discipline must be 
redressed.301  
 
The laissez-faire approach enables fintech companies to. reach too-big-to-fail from tpp-big-to-small. 
Although, this unstable growth impose significant risks on financial stability and consumer protection. 
Stpecific regulations can distrupt the growth of the expansion of fintech services due to the fact that it 
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will increase compliance costs. Case by case approach and structured experimentalism seems like the 
most appropriate approach because it will promote innovation in a safe area. However, the results that 
obtained through hese approaches can  be deceptive due to the fact that they are open to small number 
of companies and the result of which may not be coherent with the all fintech ecosystem. 
 
Chapter V – Regulatory Examples  
 
5.1. How it is regulated in the UK and the China 
 
So far, four main approaches to regulation of financial technologies have been analysed. There is a 
great benefit to analyse the how it is regulated in the countries in which the financial technologies sector 
has a large market volume. It can be said that China takes the lead in the sector and it is followed by 
the UK.302 The practices in the UK and China will be analysed and according to the findings it is going 
to be assessed that in which aspects their approaches will create a healthier environment for the 
development of fintech services is going to be assessed.  
 
 4.4.1. China 
 
The significant expansion in the number of participants and the variety of non-traditional digital financial 
sector has already changed the shape of the financial system since 2013.303 The latest figures in China 
illustrate that investment in fintech enterprises in 2018, reached to US$25.5 billion: this figure is almost 
amount to total global figure (US$26.7 billion) in 2017 .304 Moreover, the China’s largest segment is 
digital commerce, with a total transaction value of USD 855,465 million in 2018.305 
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There are several factors that triggered China’s exponential growth in the sector, mainly there are two 
main actors of these improvements. First, the Chinese government have maintained a positive attitude 
to financial technologies in order to liberalise and to enhance financial inclusion.306 The other driving 
force behind is that the incompatibility between the demands of consumers and the inadequate supply 
of finance services by conventional financial institutions has provided appropriate conditions for the 
expansion of digital finance.307 
 
The pioneer and leading company in this filed is Alibaba Group, which is the world’s largest e-commerce 
firm.308 Alibaba has launched several products in different sectors.309 With regard to third-party online 
payment services in China, its transaction volume reached approximately $30.27 trillion (the total 
number is $41.51B) in 2018.310 90% of the total market share is occupied by Ali Pay and WeChat Pay. 
Alipay has currently 1 billion users.311 Another important digital finance services in China is P2P Lending, 
under which the accumulated amount of loan provided was about $1.16 trillion at the end of January 
2019.312  
 
As indicated above, at first, Chinese regulators have taken the laissez-faire approach which allowed 
fertilise the ground for innovation.313 The exponential growth took non-traditional financial companies 
from too-small-to-care to too big to fail, after which the concerns about regulation side had arisen. As a 
result of light regulations, for instance, the P2P lending services have collapsed, which indicated flaws 
in the current regulatory framework.314  Thus, in 2015, a guideline for digital finance services was 
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published in order to prevent a second major crisis.315 It is underlined that at first, this guideline had not 
been transferred into practice due to lack of regulation.316  
 
 P2P Lending and Investment-Based Crowdfunding 
Unlike the UK, there was not a unified regulator in China governs P2P lending.317 Therefore, multiple 
regulatory entities increased the possibility of regulatory arbitrage and thereby, the concerns regarding 
to financial stability were at stake.318 With the rules published, it was imposed a limitation on the total 
figure that can be borrowed, which is between RMB 1 million to RMB 5 million, depending on the 
borrower across multiple platforms.319 Also, some transparency requirements were imposed, such as 
lending statistics and the rate of defaults.320  New rules prohibited some existing practices such as 
guaranteeing investments and mandated the depositing of client funds.321 Furthermore, the regulators 
have mandated P2P platforms to keep their funds in a custodian bank. After two years of implementation 
of such rules, provincial government agencies were told to complete the evaluation and registration of 
qualified P2P platforms.322  It is worth noting that online P2P lending will be recorded at central bank 
credit reference system in order to prevent irregular activities.323 In detail, it is required to disclose their 
information including online lending rates. 
 
With regard to investment-based crowdfunding platforms, their regulatory statues remain uncertain, 
meaning which there are no explicit catch-all regulation or regulatory body for equity crowdfunding in 
China.324 Nevertheless, there are some thresholds: the platforms which do not hold a licence have to 
be registered to China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). There are prerequisites that 
platforms and investors have to fulfil: platforms must not offer investment opportunity related to their 
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company; investors must have a net asset amount to CNY 10 million or CNY 3 million and an average 
annual income of CNY 500,000 for the past three years.325 
 
 Payment Services  
Until recently, there were not any restrictions on mobile payment services. For instance, banks did not 
have the ability to control transactions executed by third party payment services which in turn enabled 
illicit activities. With the latest regulation, China’s central bank (“PBOC”) has become the supervisory 
authority.326 Non-bank firms that wish to facilitate payment services must hold a licence, and therefore, 
they need to comply with certain requirements such as minimum capital, not outsourcing its 
services.327Now, PBOC can track and monitor all capital flows of these third-party payment providers, 
and therefore, it will be more effective to prevent anti-money laundering activities and tax evasion issues. 
In addition, these firms are required to follow “know your client” (KYC) rules, which are requirements 
meant to ensure the effective verification of clients’ real identities. Depending on the means of customer 
verification, there are limitations on transaction amount limit. In addition, payment services are under 
obligation to provide risk management system and remedy mechanisms in the case of a default.  
 
Previously, the customer funds could be held in personal accounts of service providers. The Central 
Bank declared that it will not pay interest on the deposited money, which will have a huge impact on 
platforms’ profits.328 Another repressive rule that will decrease the profit of platforms is the prohibition of 
investing customer funds into mutual funds or peer to peer loans329 New rules will enable enhanced 
customer protection and redress the financial stability balance.330 The Central bank raised the ratio of 
reserve funds from 20% to 50%, which required to be held in a state-approved commercial bank. 
 
                                                 
325 Ibid 
326 Chen Jia and He Wei, (2019)“PBOC reins in funds of payment platforms” 
http://www.china.org.cn/business/201901/15/content_74373549.htm 
327 Hogan Lovells, Third Party Payment Licences in China - Are They within The Grasp of Foreign 
Investors? http://www.lapres.net/hl.pdf 
328 Ibid 
329 Xu Ming, Controlling interst https://www.pressreader.com 
330 Ibid 
« Regulating Financial Technology – Opportunities and Risks» 
 51 
With regard to foreign third-party payment firms to operate in China, the new rules enable foreign 
business to facilitate in China.331 In general, it can be said that China aims to promote competition in the 
sector. Foreign firms, first, have to set up a local business in order to apply for a payment services 
license.332 Moreover, it is required that client data and other financial information have to be stored in 
China, as well as these firms are obligated to set up technology and data infrastructure.333  
 
 Cryptocurrency  
The Central bank also acts as regulatory body in the matter of blockchain and cryptocurrencies. In 2018, 
it has published a working paper which reveals issuance of legitimate digital currency. It states that the 
cryptocurrency which is issued by central bank will be deemed as fiat currency and the other, non-
sovereign, cryptocurrencies shall not be regarded as currencies. In other words, it is emphasized that it 
is essentially similar to a kind of commodity that can be circulated.334 Nevertheless, it is underlined that 
if they are deemed as commodities, then value-added tax, for the sale of intangible assets, may be 
imposed.335 Therefore,  tax regulation has not been imposed on cryptocurrencies. A joint statement 
published, by the central bank and government bodies, prohibited the Initial Coin Offering, which is a 
fundraising method.336 With this prohibition, it is aimed to prevent illegal fundraising, financial fraud and 
pyramid schemes. 
 
4.4.2. the United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom is the other leading country in financial technologies. The total investment in digital 
finance companies reached over $20.7bn.337 It is noteworthy that the total figure of investment hit a peak 
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in 2018, despite the Brexit concerns.338  It can be said that there is no explicit regime for fintech activities. 
The UK is categorized as the most fintech-friendly jurisdiction in the world, owing to the fact that there 
were official initiatives to promote the innovation in the sector and regulation by sandbox regimes.339  
 
 Payment Services  
The original payment services regulation was introduced in 2009, whereas this regulation fell behind on 
the new payment services. Therefore, payment service regulation was amended in line with the 
provisions of PSDII, which is an EU directive. The European Banking Authority (EBA) has developed 
regulatory technical standards.340 There are other requirements: the focus, in general, is on “applicants’ 
security policies, governance, business continuity arrangements, and access to sensitive data 
processes as described in those guidelines, taking into account firms’ business models”.341 
 
The regulation is segmented based on the type of payment service providers as an authorised Payment 
Institutions (“PI”), a small PI or Account information service (AIS) and payment initiation service (PIS). 
PIS can be explained as a “service which accesses a user’s payment account to initiate the transfer of 
funds on their behalf with the user’s consent and authentication”. AIS are used to obtain data from a 
user’s account held with another provider (typically a bank) in order to provide financial insights. 
 
There is an initial and ongoing capital requirement for authorised PIs, which is dependent on the service 
provided.342 PI’s may conduct services just money remittances or PIS, for which the minimum initial 
capital required is small amount compared to the PIs which accept deposit and execute payment 
transactions.343 These type of PIs have to use their own fund for capital requirements.344 With regard to 
AIS, there is no capital requirement because they do not control individuals’ payment accounts. 
Furthermore, all authorised PIs are immediately required to take safeguarding requirements set it out in 
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the regulation with the purpose of protection of customers where funds are held by an institution. There 
are two ways investigated in order to safeguard relevant funds: the separation of customer funds with 
institution’s working capital and other funds; to cover relevant funds by an insurance policy in case of 
insolvency of the platform. 
 
On the other hand, companies that have “an average payment transactions turnover that does not 
exceed €3 million per month” is classified as a small PI and they cannot provide AIS and PIS services. 
There is not a minimum capital requirement or mandatory safeguards imposed on small PIs.  
 
In general, the UK’s regulatory approach regarding payment services reflects “case by case” or 
“structured experimentalism”. The requirements are varying spending on the type of service and volume 
of service. Where a company fall into classification of small PI, which does not impose a significant risk 
to the finance sector and consumer protection, is only required to registration. Whereas, a company 
conduct complex and high amount of transactions are required to comply with strict requirements.  
 
 Investment-Based and Loan-Based (P2P) Crowdfunding  
FCA issued a policy statement regarding to loan-based (P2P) and investment-based crowd- funding. 
Even though, there are general requirements for both types, it is stressed that the rules which apply to 
equity-based crowdfunding is stricter than those applying to of P2P lending due to the fact that online 
lending is considered to be less risky than equity crowdfunding. The UK is the first country that has a 
P2P lending platform.345 It has a disclosure-based regulatory system for P2P, which aims to promote 
transparency, improve competition and enhance the protection of customers.346 Firms needs 
authorization to provide P2P services. It is worth noting that P2P and Investment- based loans are not 
backed by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS).347 The rules focus on P2P lending 
aiming to ensure that individuals and business have access clear information about borrowers.348 As 
well as there are minimum capital and money for protection of customers money requirements. Finally, 
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platforms are required to have resolution plans: meaning that if a platform is collapsing, it should ensure 
that it will continue to pursue the collection of loan payments.349  
 
If the borrower is an individual or relevant recipient of credit (“a partnership consisting of two or three 
persons not all of whom are corporate bodies”), the agreement will be subject to Consumer Credit Act 
(CCA) and Consumer Credit Sourcebook (CONC).350 There are several other requirements that firms 
have to abide by, such as Principles for Businesses (PRIN)  Senior Management Arrangements, 
Systems and Controls sourcebook (SYSC) Threshold Conditions (COND).  Where firms wishing to hold 
clients’ money and safe custody assets, they have to comply with Clients Assets Sourcebook (CASS). 
 
It is worth noting that depending on the core business model, the obligations of platforms will vary. All 
types of platforms are obligated to carry out due diligence on and administration of  potential investment 
opportunities due the fact that platforms’ role is just matching lenders with borrowers.351 In addition, 
discretionary and pricing platforms are held responsible for accurate pricing because they act akin to a 
discretionary manager for the investor.352 As well as these platforms are required to have an appropriate 
risk management system in place.353 With regard to discretionary type platforms, “which set the price of 
P2P loans and also choose the investor’s portfolio of loans to generate a given target rate of return”, 
additional risk management parameters are imposed.354 For instance, “platforms must re-value P2P 
loans that have defaulted and at the point an investor enters into, or exits, a loan”.355  
For the purposes of establishment and maintenance of a platform’s risk management framework, the 
platform should have to designate a person, who will have the responsibility on this matter.356 It is 
underlined that this type of business should be able to illustrate that it uses appropriate data, even if the 
data provided via third party and it has to have the transparency regarding the actual performance 
against target rates.357 
                                                 
349 Ibid 
350 Sian Wakeling, “Regulated crowdfunding” (2019)  https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-
005-5751?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1 
351 FCA, (n.346) 
352 Ibid 
353 Ibid 
354 Ibid 
355 Ibid  
356 Ibid 
357 Ibid 
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 Cryptocurrencies and Smart Contracts 
The legal position of blockchain or cryptocurrencies is still a question in the UK, meaning that they are 
not recognized as legal tender.358 FCA, which published a guide on cryptoassests, prefers to remain 
technology neutral in this sense. Within the perimeter of the guidance, the holder of a cryptocurrency 
does not hold any right accompanied with it. It is worth noting wherever cryptocurrencies are used to 
facilitate regulated payment services, they have to provide relevant permissions, and to follow relevant 
rules and regulations.359 With regard to anti-money laundering requirements, they are expected to 
introduced in the beginning of the 2020 and  will cover exchange services, such as issuance of new 
cryptocurrencies through ICO’s, publication of open-source software, transfer of cryptocurrencies.360 
There are no guidance or regulations regarding to smart contracts.  
 
 Robo-Advisor 
With regard to robo-advisors, FCA published a guidance which covers both automated advice services 
and traditional in person advice models. It is underlined that the requirements on providing financial 
advice are technology neutral. It worth noting that regulators in the UK acknowledge that robo-advisors 
are still developing industry and therefore, innovation should be supported. In this sense, FCA facilitates 
Advice Unit, which is akin to Regulatory Sandbox, that provides regulatory feedback to firms which meet 
the eligibility criteria.361 In general, robo-advisors like any type financial advisors have to abide by with 
financial instruments directive (MiFID) and AML and so on. In this sense, firms are required to provide 
adequate level of information to their customers regarding to “the firm, designated investments and 
proposed investment strategies as well as costs”.362 In addition,  the FCA’s Conduct of Business 
Sourcebook (COBS) mandates that firms must retrieve  information about their customers’ knowledge 
and experience in order to make a decision or make a suggestion which is suitable for the client.363 
                                                 
358 FCA, “Guidance on Cryptoassets” (2019)( CP19/3) 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/cp19-03.pdf pg. 21 
359 Ibid 
360FCA, “Guidance on Cryptoassets Feedback and Final Guidance to CP 19/3” (2019) 
(PS19/22)https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps19-22.pdf 
361 FCA, “Advice Unit”, (2018) https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/advice-unit  
362 FCA, Automated investment services - our expectations (2018) 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/multi-firm-reviews/automated-investment-services-our-
expectations 
363 Ibid 
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Within the FCA's Project Innovate there are five sub-units: policy & management, regulatory sandbox, 
direct support team, the advice unit, and innovate regtech. The purpose of this organization is to promote 
innovation and tackle regulatory barriers as well as ensure market stability and consumer protection.364 
This approach can be categorised as structured experimentalism. In detail, as explained above, there 
are several requirements to be fulfilled in order to conduct a regulated activity in the UK. Instead of 
exposing confusing requirements, businesses can test their product under a protected environment, 
which provides certain pre-determined safeguards and rules. 
 
5.2. Possible Best Approach  
 
It has not been decades since fintech products were launched; nevertheless, their development has 
been at an unprecedented rate. However, under most jurisdictions fintech services are not completely 
or even mostly regulated. Notwithstanding that, even in the regulated countries the implications of this 
(lack of accumulated knowledge) have been observed. It is critical to come up with tailored regulations. 
Therefore, purpose of this section is to suggest a regulatory approach for the -fintech services. The most 
important point of the matter is: regulation must serve a particular purpose and produce intended results 
in order to be considered effective.  Each approach has its own merits; nevertheless, it will not be 
practical to adopt just one of the approaches by itself. 
 
The main focus should be on the risks that were identified in Chapter III; especially financial stability and 
consumers’ interests matters play a key role. The Crisis illustrated that the financial sector is highly 
integrated. Even though the volume of fintech transactions does not constitute a significant portion of 
the financial sector, mismanagement in this point (risks) can have detrimental effects. That is why 
regulators should ensure adequate level of protection, regardless of the type of service. As stated above, 
the laissez-faire approach has given a great advantage to China-based fintech and big-tech companies, 
as it enabled these companies to reach too-big-to-fail from too-small-to-care. Despite the positive impact 
of the laissez-faire approach, China faced several heists, scams and fraudulent activities that reflected 
the concerns on the doing nothing approach.   
                                                 
364 FCA, https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/forms/project-innovate-criteria.pdf 
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With regard to payment services and crowdfunding (P2P and investment based) services, the platforms 
that do not act only as an intermediary should be subjected to specific regulations. In detail, some of 
these platforms accept deposits and provide credit score services, which impose a significant risk on 
customers’ interests and financial stability. Even if they do not accept deposit, they are involved in the 
circulation and reallocation of money. 
 
The UK implementation constitutes an efficient example. The platforms are required to satisfy several 
prerequisites, depending on the type and trading volume of the service. For instance, mechanisms (such 
as capital and liquidity requirements as well as insolvency and resolution mechanism) are effective 
methods. It should be emphasized that there are several regulations and rules as well as guidelines 
issued in the UK, which may create confusion and be costly and therefore maybe frighten off investors. 
However, innovation hubs and regulatory sandboxes are providing opportunity for the businesses that 
would have difficulties satisfying regulatory parameters.  It is worth noting that there are no rules 
imposed on investors’ perspective in the UK. There should be a regulation on the investors side also, in 
order to provide minimum protection. In this sense China’s new proposed regulations constitutes a 
useful example, which requires investors to have minimum net asset. 
 
Regulation of crypto assets are still a question: there are significant diversity of opinions about their 
classification. Nevertheless, there are two issues that should be subjected to specific regulations. Firstly, 
crypto assets as a mean of exchange (cryptocurrencies) and the way that they are stored should be 
primarily settled/utilized. There should be a licence requirement (for whomever who aims to provide this 
service) that prompts customer protection and financial stability and controls illicit activities. 
 
After these providers are deemed to be eligible to obtain the licence, they should be subjected to 
annually external auditing by auditors who are specialists about KYC/AML and also by blockchain 
analytics specialists. An equivalent of this practice is that public companies have to be audited under 
most jurisdictions. This approach may be criticized due to excessive compliance cost; however, if the 
worth of stolen cryptocurrencies are taken into account, this cost would be an affordable price.  
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With regard to smart contracts, the best approach would be the laissez-faire approach. Smart contracts 
are relatively pristine compared to other services. Imposing strict regulations would supress the 
innovation. Structured experimentalism would not provide the intended outcome, due to the fact that the 
number of smart contracts is not big enough to accumulate sufficient data (in order to gain 
comprehensive knowledge). 
 
While authorities are assessing the best approach to digital financial services, they should be monitoring 
them in order to analyse whether the benefits outweigh the risks. In other words, monitoring will enable 
authorities to assess outcomes of fintech services as they satisfy the intended outcomes and following 
that, the tailored approach can be taken based on the risks they impose on the finance industry. In 
practice, the monitoring activity is conducted by subsidiaries of authorities or the banks, depending on 
the jurisdiction. Nevertheless, nationally based monitoring institutions do not satisfy the aimed outcome, 
due to the fact that platforms are not physically located in one place and because customers of these 
products can conveniently access them from all around the world. That is why there is a need for 
supranational monitoring association.   
 
A relevant example of this issue is Legal Entity Identifier (LEI), which is a reference code prompted by 
the Financial Stability Board (FSB) after which identified by the G20 countries, with the purposes of 
monitoring financial activities in the global sense.365 Before the LEI system, it was impossible to 
recognize transactions details of individual corporations due to the fact that each country had a different 
code system.366 This system can be used to enable data transaction among different borders. Based on 
this system, a committee was established; it has 72 members at the moment.367 In general, it is  
responsible for policy standards such as: “due diligence, and any other standards necessary to ensure 
sufficient data quality, and the principles governing data and information access”.368  
 
A similar committee should be established with regard to fintech services, where especially the 
movements of non-traditional banking should be the main consideration. The committee should issue a 
                                                 
Ibid365 Ka Kei Chan, Alistair Milne. The Global Legal Entity Identifier System: How Can It Deliver? 
Journal of Risk and Financial Management. 2019;(1):1 
366 Ibid 
367 Ibid 
368 Ibid 
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guidance that promotes innovation and takes the identified risks into account. Establishing a committee 
will enhance data aggregation and risk reporting, which in turn will create a balanced development. By 
means of using the accumulated information on these matters, it will be possible to come up with tailored 
regulations on KYC and AML issues.    
 
 In national level, authorities should establish regulatory sandboxes for two purposes: firstly, regulatory 
sandboxes are the perfect environment to promote innovation while preserving financial stability; 
second, they can be used to monitor fintech activities and then accumulated data regarding their activity 
can send to international committee.    
 
Chapter VI – Conclusion  
 
The technological innovations have led financial products to step into a new age. This dissertation 
begins with describing the history of financial technologies and the Global Financial Crisis considered 
as a milestone for the development in digital finance. While technological expansion has continued, the 
Crises led to significant changes in the sector. After the Crisis, the trust on banks by individuals and 
companies have seen a dramatical fall, which in turn, caused a considerable increase in the number of 
new fintech companies. The scope of activity of these new entrants can be divided into three main 
sections: credit, deposit and capital-raising services; payments, clearing and settlement services; 
investment management services. It was not possible to study each type of services due to the wide 
range of services. For this reason, this dissertation focused on payment services, crowdfunding, peer 
to peer lending cryptocurrency, smart contracts and robo advisor.  
 
It can be said that payment services are the first branch that non-traditional banking firms developed. 
Even though new entrants are able to process and settle payments through its infrastructure, their need 
for banks is not diminished yet. One of innovations provided by fintech companies is that crowdfunding. 
For the purpose of this dissertation investment-based and P2P were the main focus, which are a money-
raising method and borrowing loan methods, respectively. Conventionally, when obtaining a loan or 
raising money for individuals or enterprises is an endless process due to banks over thresholds, 
however, they can borrow money more conveniently throw new channels.  
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With regard to cryptocurrency, which is a distributed, decentralized, public ledger based on blockchain 
technology, is a digital asset function as a medium exchange. The  aim with this invention is to diminish 
the need for a central authority. Smart contracts are computer code that running automatically according 
to prespecified functions. The purpose of this innovation is to diminish human interference for and the 
reduce costs of execution of the contracts. Lastly, robo-advisors discussed, which provide digital 
financial advice based on mathematical rules or algorithms. 
 
The dissertation, then, analysed the effects of new entrants on the financial system as the benefits and 
risks that fintech companies accompany. First, benefits of fintech analysed, which are: the potential of 
raising efficiency; decreasing fees; advanced access to financial services; diminishing the need for a 
central authority. On the other hand, there are risks accompanied by these innovations should not be 
underestimated, which are: legal risks (regulatory arbitrage and lack of control), data security, theft, anti-
money laundering, third-party reliance, liquidity and mismatch risk, and macro-financial risks  
 
Overall, it could be said that the risks, that fintech impose on the financial sector and individuals, 
overweigh its benefits at the moment, which lead this essay to focus on regulatory issues. In other 
words, regulators should be fascinated with exciting innovations, on the contrary, they should take the 
measures before these risks have an impact on financial stability. The balance must be redressed 
between encouraging innovation and risks imposed on individuals and the finance sector. There are 
four possible approach to fintech development: the laissez-faire (doing nothing), case by case basis, 
structured experimentalism and adoption of new regulatory frameworks.  
 
The laissez-faire approach is also called as doing nothing. This approach will provide a great advantage 
for fintech companies as they do not have to concern with several requirements as imposed on banks.  
China is one of the successful examples of this approach, in which fintech companies had a fast-growing 
environment; yet the positive perception came to an end when the fintech or big-tech companies have 
reached to the scale of too-big-to-fail, and several scams and heists took place. The opposite approach 
to this is “specific regulatory framework”, and the aim is to minimise financial exposure risk and enhance 
the protection. It is emphasized that every company which takes part in any financial matter should be 
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regulated in the same way Although, this safe approach will increase the fees and restrict the speed of 
innovation. The other approaches are case by case and structured experimentalism, both of which 
provides controlled freedom. No-action letters, restricted licensing and special charters are the ways to 
provide exception in case by case basis.  
 
While structured experimentalism also provides exceptions, providing that some conditions, it is more 
systematic and accessible by large groups. There are several types structured experimentalism such 
as sandbox umbrella, regulatory sandbox an innovation hub.  After analysing each approach, it can be 
said that the size of fintech companies, the development level of banks and protection of individuals and 
financial stability should be taken account. With regard to data protection, cybersecurity and financial 
stability issues, regulators impose strict regulation. Where the size of fintech companies are small, 
regulators could have an affirmative approach. For instance, Chinese regulators allowed the growth of 
fintech and when the companies became a risk for the financial system, they have taken the technology-
neutral approach. On the other hand, the UK’s regulatory sandboxes are the best example for a 
balanced environment, which allows fintech companies to be active in highly regulated areas and 
provides adequate safeguards. It can be said that is why the UK have become the most invested country 
in the world. When the pace of innovation is considered, it is more sensible to take structured 
experimentalism approach. As indicated in the section 5.2., regardless from the fact that which approach 
is implemented, the authorities should establish national monitoring organizations. This duty can be 
given the regulatory sandboxes as they will already have the most of the data’s of fintech companies. 
After this step, a multilateral body will prevent a new global crisis and it will bring AML, theft, consumer 
protection issues under control.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
« Regulating Financial Technology – Opportunities and Risks» 
 62 
BIBLOGRAPHY 
A. Primary Sources  
 
Statute(s) 
- EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
-  
Cases 
- HMRC v University of Cambridge (Case C-316/18), EU:C:2019:559 
 
A. Secondary Sources  
 
Books 
- Bertolotti M. the History of  the Laser 263-95 (2004) 
- Burniske C.and Tatar J., “Cryptoassets : the innovative investor's guide to bitcoin and beyond” 
(McGraw-Hill Education 2018)  
- Chuen D. L. K. and Deng R. H. “Handbook of Blockchain, digital finance and inclusion Vol.1” 
(Academic Press 2018) 
- Cronin M J. Banking And Finance On The Internet (Maryj. Cronin Ed., 2001). 
- DuPont Q., “Cryptocurrencies and Blockchains”. (Medford, MA: Polity, 2019)  
- Funk A. S., Crowdfunding in China A New Institutional Economics Approach.(Springer 2019) 
- G., “Rolling out new products across international markets : causes of delays” (Palgrave 
Macmillan  2004) 
- Girasa R., “Regulation of Cryptocurrencies and blockchain technologies National and 
International Perspectives”, ( Palgrave Macmillan, 2018)  
- Grell K. B.and Others, “Crowdfunding The Corporate Era” ( Elliot and Thompson 2015) 
- Hindman M., “The internet trap : how the digital economy builds monopolies and undermines 
democracy / Hindman, (Princeton University Press  2018) 
- Hudon M., and others, “A research agenda for financial inclusion and microfinance” ( Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2019)  
« Regulating Financial Technology – Opportunities and Risks» 
 63 
- Kuppens T., and others, “Banking Supervision at the Crossroads (Edward Elgar Publishing 
2003) pg. 220  
- Lee D. anad others, “Inclusive fintech : blockchain, cryptocurrency and ICO” (World Scientific 
Publishing Co., 2018) 
- Lerner T. Mobile Payment Springer (Vieweg 2013) 
- Print F. H., “Big data : storage, sharing and security” ( CRC Press, 2016) 
- Standage T., The Victorian Internet: The Remarkable Story of the Telegraph and the 
Nineteenth Century’s On-line Pioneers (New York: Bloomsbury, 1998). 
Articles 
 
-  
-  
-  
-  
-  
- ‘Central bank opens doors to foreign third-party payment firms’ (2018), http://0-
search.ebscohost.com.serlib0.essex.ac.uk/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsens&AN=edsens.60
8064884&site=eds-live  
- A., ‘Peer-to-Peer Lending: Innovative Access to Credit and The Consequences Of Dodd-
Frank’ (2010) 25 Wash L Found L Backgrounder 1, 1. 
- Barberis J. and others, “FinTech, RegTech, and the Reconceptualization of Financial 
Regulation”, (2017).37 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 371. 
- Belleflamme P. and others. Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd”. Journal of Business 
Venturing. Forthcoming; CORE Discussion Paper No. 2011/32. 
- Broll U., and others, Transparency in the banking sector, Dresden discussion paper series in 
economics, (2011) No. 05/11, Techn. Univ., Fac. of Business and Economics, Dresden 
- Brummer C. discusses the new objectives faced by regulators following the GFC. See Chris 
Brummer, ‘Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation’ (2015) 84 Fordham Law Review 
977, 1037. Iris Chiu discusses the reasons for these new regulatory objectives: see Chiu, 
above n 8, 68. 
« Regulating Financial Technology – Opportunities and Risks» 
 64 
- Buckley R. P., “Financial Innovation in East Asia” 2014, 37 Seattle L. Rev. pg. 307 
- Burge M. E., “Apple Pay, Bitcoin, and Consumers: The ABCs of Future Public Payments Law” 
(2016) 67 Hastings L.J. 1493, pg.1493 
- Caldieraro F.and others, “Strategic Information Transmission in Peer-to-Peer Lending 
Markets” (2018) 82(2) Journal of Marketing 42-63 
- Caprio Gerard, Jr. Financial Regulation After the Crisis: How Did We Get Here, and How Do 
We Get Out? Lse Fınancıal Markets Group Specıal Paper Serıes 
- Chan K. K., Milne A. The Global Legal Entity Identifier System: How Can It Deliver? Journal of 
Risk and Financial Management. 2019;(1):1 
- Cheney J. S., “An Examination Of Mobile Banking And Mobile Payments: Building Adoption 
As Experience Goods?”, FRB of Philadelphia - Payment Cards Center Discussion Paper No. 
08-07, 2008,11 N. Delic and A. Vukasinovic, “Mobile payment solution - symbiosis between 
banks, application service providers and mobile network operators,” 3rd International 
Conference on Information Technology: New Generation, Proceedings. Third International 
Conference on Information Technology: New Generation, IEEE Computer Society, 2006, pp. 
346-350. 
- China UK Equity Crowdfunding Regulatory and Market Comparison Study (2017) 
http://bop.co.uk/assets/others/China_UK_Crowdfunding_Regulatory_and_Market_Report_Fin
al_24072017.pdf 
- Coffee J., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to be 
Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 1019, 1029 (2012) 
- Crawford K. and Schultz J., “Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress 
Predictive Privacy Harms”, (2014) 55 B.C.L. Rev. 93  
- Cunningham L. A. "A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of "Principles-Based Systems" in 
Corporate Law, Securities Regulation and Accounting." Vanderbilt Law Review 60, (2007): 
1409-1494. 
- David Mashburn, “The Anti-Crowd Pleaser: Fixing the Crowdfund Act’s Hidden Risks and 
Inadequate Remedies”.(2013) 63(1) Emory Law Journal, 127-174 
- Douglas W. Arner &Janos Barberis, Remarks at Regulating FinTech Innovation: A Balancing 
Act, 2015), 
« Regulating Financial Technology – Opportunities and Risks» 
 65 
- Dushnitsky G., “Crowded Room” (2013) 24(3) Business Strategy Review 28-31 
- Evans D. and A. Pirchio (2015) ‘An Empirical Examination of Why Mobile Money Schemes 
Ignite in Some Developing Countries but Flounder in Most’, Coase-Sandor Institute for Law 
and Economics Working Paper no 723. 
- FCA, “Automated investment services - our expectations” 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/multi-firm-reviews/automated-investment-services-our-
expectations 
- Fein M. L., “Robo-Advisors: A Closer Look” (2015) SSRN Working Paper : 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2658701. 
- Financial Regulation - National Bank Chartering - OCC Allows Fintech Companies to Apply for 
National Bank Charters. Harvard Law Review. 2018;(Issue 4):1361 
- Financial Stability Analysis Group of PBOC China Financial Stability Report 2014  
- Francisco K. and Swanson D., The Supply Chain Has No Clothes: Technology Adoption of 
Blockchain for Supply Chain Transparency Logistics 2018, 2, 2.  Pg.1  
- GDDFI Discussion paper, Digital Financial Services: Regulating For Financial Inclusion An Ict 
Perspective https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
D/Conferences/GSR/Documents/GSR2016/Digital_financial_inclusion_GDDFI.pdf   
- Golic Z., “Advantages of Crowdfunding as an Alternative Source of Financing of Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises”(2014) (8) Proceedings of the Faculty of Economics in East 
Sarajevo,:39-48 
- GSMA regulatory and policy trends impacting digital identity and the role of mobile 4,10,16 
(2016) 
- I.D. A. and others, “Methodological Aspects of Prioritization of Financial Tools for Stimulation 
of Innovative Activities” (2016) 19(2), European Research Studies Journal 100-112 
- Institute of International Finance ‘ Getting Smart: Contracts on the Blockchain 2016 
- Ivashina V. and Scharfstein D., “Bank Lending During the Financial Crisis of 2008” (2010) 
97(3) Journal of Financial Economics:319-338. 
- Jakšič M. and Marinc M., “Relationship Banking and Information Technology: The Role of 
Artificial Intelligence and Fintech” Risk Management,1-18. DOI:10.1057/s41283-018-0039-y 
- Jenik I. and Lauer K. “Regulatory Sa 
« Regulating Financial Technology – Opportunities and Risks» 
 66 
- Jung D. and others, “Robo-Advisory” (2018) 60(1) Business & Information Systems 
Engineering 2018,  pp 81–86  
- KPMG, “Robo advising Catching up and getting ahead” 
https://home.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/07/Robo-Advising-Catching-Up-And-Getting-
Ahead.pdf 
- Kshetri N., and Acharya S., “Mobile payments in emerging markets.” (2012) 14(4),  IT 
Professional, 9-13. 
- Kutar M. and Addis M., "The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Emerging 
Technologies and UK Organisations: Awareness, Implementation and Readiness" (2018). UK 
Academy for Information Systems Conference Proceedings. 29. 
- Kuzuno H. and Karam C., “Blockchain explorer: An analytical process and investigation 
environment for bitcoin.” APWG Symposium on Electronic Crime Research, Scottsdale, AZ, 
2017, pp. 9-16.  
- Lawrence A. Cunningham Prescriptıon To Retire The Rhetoric Of “Prıncıples-Based Systems” 
In Corporate Law, Securıtıes Regulatıon And Accountıng   Vanderbılt Law Revıew 2007) 
- Lu L., “Promoting SME Finance in the Context of the Fintech Revolution: A Case Study of the 
UK’s Practice and Regulation”, (2018), 33(3)Banking and Finance Law Review , pp. 317-343 
- Mark F., and others, A Primer on Blockchain, Smart Contracts & Crypto-Assets Lex Research 
Topics in Corporate Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2019-3. 
- MaxsonS., and others “UK Cryptoassets Taskforce publishes its final report”. Journal of 
Investment Compliance. 2019 
- Mckenzie K., “147 Million Social Security Numbers for Sale: Developing Data Protection 
Legislation After Mass Cybersecurity Breaches”, 104 IOWA L. REV. 417, 421-435 (2018)  
- ndboxes and Financial Inclusion” (2017) Working Paper. Washington, D.C.: CGAP. 
- O’Shields R., ‘Smart Contracts: Legal Arrangements Fort he Blockchain’, 21 North Carolina 
Banking Institute 179 
- Otýpková M. “Financial Crisis and Its Impacts on the Stock Market”. Acta Oeconomica 
Pragensia (2010), (4)3 http://0-
search.ebscohost.com.serlib0.essex.ac.uk/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.p
rg.jnlaop.v2010y2010i4id309p3.11&site=eds-live 
« Regulating Financial Technology – Opportunities and Risks» 
 67 
- Ozili P. K., “Impact of Digital Finance on Financial Inclusion and Stability” (2018) MPRA Paper 
84771, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/84771/ 
- Philippon T. Working Papers No 655 The FinTech Opportunity by 2017 
- Porta R. L. et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46. Econ Literature 285 
(2008). 
- Pyburn G., “Bitcoin Legal: Taxonomy of Regulatory Reactions, APAC’s Outlook and Potential 
for BTC-Linked Derivatives”, Lexology ( 2014), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0eb2ec8e-d7a5-43ab-b177- 617fd0c981f9. 
- Rubanov P.and others, ‘analysis of development of alternative finance models depending on 
the regional affiliation of countries’, Business & Economic Horizons. 2019;15(1):90-106 
- S. Singh and N. Singh, ‘‘Blockchain: Future of financial and cyber security,’’ in Proc. 2nd Int. 
Conf. Contemp. Comput. Inform. (IC3I), Dec. 2016, pp. 463–467. 
- Sander F. and others, “The acceptance of blockchain technology in meat traceability and 
transparency” (2018) 2,2 Logistics 
- Sebring S. “Third-Party and Cybersecurity Risk Management. Credit Union Management”. 
2018;41(3):40.  
- Seru A. and others “Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks,” NBER 
Working Papers No 23288. (2017) 
- Silva L. A. P. da, “Fintech in EMEs: blessing or curse?” BIS 
https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp180620.pdf pg. 6 
- Stanley M., “Can P2P Lending Reinvent Banking?”, www.morganstanley.com, 2015 
- Stanley R. L and Buckley R. P, “Protecting The West, Excluding The Rest: The Impact Of The 
Aml/Ctf Regime On Financial Inclusion In The Pacific And Potential Responses” Melb. J. Int'l 
L. 17:83. Swan, M. 2015. Blockchain: Blueprint For A New Economy 
- Stern A. D., Innovation under regulatory uncertainty: Evidence from medical technology, 
Harvard University, 2014, available at: http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/-/media/Files/Programs-
and-Areas/Strategy/papers/JMP_Stern_Jan_2014.pdf. 
- Tang T., and others, “The Rise of Digital Finance in China: New Drivers, New Game, New 
Strategy”, The Boston Consulting Group (2014) at 5-6. 
- Verstein A., ‘The Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending’ (2011) 45 UCDL Rev 445, 452 
« Regulating Financial Technology – Opportunities and Risks» 
 68 
- Xiao L. “Improving China’s P2p Lending Regulatory System: An Examination Of International 
Regulatory Experience” (2016) US-China Law Review, 13(6), 460-473. 
- Yonghee K. and others, “The Adoption of Mobile Payment Services for “Fintech”, International 
Journal of Applied Engineering Research Vol. 11, No 2 
- Zesche  D. and others “FinTech and RegTech: Enabling Innovation While Preserving 
Financial Stability” (2017) 18(3) Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 47 [2018] pg. 7 
- Zetzsche D. A., Buckley R. P., Arner D. W., Barberis J. N. “Regulating a Revolution: From 
Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart Regulation” (2017) 23 Fordham Journal of Corporate and 
Financial Law 31-103  
- Zhou W. and others China’s Regulation of Digital Financial Services: Some Recent 
Developments, Australian Law Journal 90(5) (2016): 297-300 
- Zhou Weihuan, Douglas W. Arner, Ross P. Buckley, “Regulation of Digital Financial Services 
in China Last Mover Advantage Tsinghua China Law Review” Vol 8:25 pg. 27 
 
Reports and Consultation papers 
 
 
-  
- ASBA, “An Overview of FinTechs: Their Benefits and Risks Association of Supervisors of 
Banks of the Americas 2017” http://www.asbasupervision.com/es/bibl/i-publicaciones-asba/i-
2-otros-reportes/1603-orep24-1/file 
- Authority for the Fin. Mkt. & De Nederlandsche Bank, More Room for Innovation in the 
Financial Sector 4 (Dec. 2016), https://www.afm.n1/~/profme 
dia/files/onderwerpen/innovation-hub/publicaties/2016/room-for-innovation-in- financial-
sector.ashx [https://perma.cc/CT94-B9F3] 
- Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Implications of fintech developments for banks 
and bank supervisors” https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d431.pdf 
- BIS, “Big tech in finance: Opportunities and Risks BIS Annual Economic Report 2019” (2019) 
https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2019e3.pdf 
« Regulating Financial Technology – Opportunities and Risks» 
 69 
- BIS, History of the Basel Committee and Its Membership (BIS, 2016) 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm accessed 10 July 2019 
- BIS, P2P lending in China , BIS Quarterly Review  
https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1809z.htm 
- Case 1:18-cv-08377-VM Document 28 (2019) 
https://www.csbs.org/sites/default/files/doc._28_order_denying_mtd_0.pdf 
- CBInsights and the World Bank, “Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey 
https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/ 
- Chen W., and others, “The Global Economic Recovery 10 Years After the 2008 Financial 
Crisis”, IMF Working Paper No. 19/83 pg. 5 
- Chun S., “E-Commerce Liability and Security Breaches in Mobile Payment for e-Business 
Sustainability” (2019) Sustainability MDPI 
- Deloitte, “Fintech by the numbers Incumbents, startups, investors adapt to maturing 
ecosystem” https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/tr/Documents/financial-
services/dcfs-fintech-by-the-numbers.pdf 
- Digital Finance Institute and McCarthy Tétrault LLP, ‘Fintech in Canada – Towards Leading 
the Global Financial Technology Transition (British Columbia Edition)’ (Report, 2016), 44 
- EBA, “Discussion Paper on the EBA’s approach to financial technology (FinTech)” 
(EBA/DP/2017/02) pg.21 
https://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1919160/EBA+Discussion+Paper+on+Fintech+%28E
BA-DP-2017-02%29.pdf 
- Eidgenossisches Finanzdepartement, Anderung des Bankengesetzes UND DF.R 
BANKENVERORDNUNG (Flntech): ERLAUTERNDER BERICHT ZUR 
Vernehmlassungsvorlage 33 (Feb. 1,2017), 
https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-74246.html  
- European Commision, Press Relase (2017) https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-
1369_en.htm 
- EY, “PE/VC Agenda India Trend Book – 2018” (2018) 
https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-pe-vc-agenda-india-trend-book-2018/$File/ey-
pe-vc-agenda-india-trend-book-2018.pdf pg.45 
« Regulating Financial Technology – Opportunities and Risks» 
 70 
- Fangfang D.and others, “From Bitcoin to Cybersecurity: a Comparative Study of Blockchain 
Application and Security Issues, Proceedings of the 2017 4th International Conference on 
Systems and Informatics (ICSAI 2017). 
- FCA, “”Loan-based (‘peer-to-peer’) and investment-based crowdfunding platforms: Feedback 
to CP18/20 and final rules” (2019) (PS19/14)  https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps19-
14.pdf 
- FCA, “Guidance on Cryptoassets Feedback and Final Guidance to CP 19/3” (2019) 
(PS19/22)https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps19-22.pdf 
- FCA, “Guidance on Cryptoassets” (2019)( CP19/3) 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/cp19-03.pdf pg. 21 
- FCA, “Payment Services and Electronic Money” https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/finalised-
guidance/fca-approach-payment-services-electronic-money-july-2018-track-changes.pdf 
- FCA, Automated investment services - our expectations (2018) 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/multi-firm-reviews/automated-investment-services-our-
expectations 
- FCA, Loan-based (‘peer-to-peer’) and investment-based crowdfunding platforms: Feedback 
on our post-implementation review and proposed changes to the regulatory framework (CP 
No.18/20, 2018) 
- FCA. “Regulatory sandbox - cohort 5” https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/regulatory-sandbox/cohort-
5 
- FSB, “FinTech and market structure in financial services: Market developments and potential 
financial stability implications” (2019) https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P140219.pdf 
- FSB, Financial Stability Implications from FinTech Supervisory and Regulatory Issues that 
Merit Authorities’ Attention (2017) https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/R270617.pdf 
- HM Treasury, “Financial inclusion report 2018-19” (2019) 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data
/file/789070/financial_inclusion_report_2018-19_web.pdf 
- HM Treasury, Expectations for the third-party access provisions in Payment Services Directive 
II 
« Regulating Financial Technology – Opportunities and Risks» 
 71 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data
/file/630135/Expectations_for_the_third_party_access_provisions_in_PSDII.pdf 
- Jagtian J. and Lemieux C., “Fintech Lending: Financial Inclusion, Risk Pricing, and Alternative 
Information” , Working paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/bank-research-conference/annual-17th/papers/14-
jagtiani.pdf 
- Koen P. A., “The Fuzzy Front End For Incremental, Platform And Breakthrough Products And 
Services” Wiley, 81-91. 
- KPMG Regulation and supervision of fintech 
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2019/03/regulation-and-supervision-of-
fintech.pdf 
- KPMG, “The Pulse of Fintech 2018 Biannual global analysis of investment in fintech” 
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2019/02/the-pulse-of-fintech-2018.pdf 
- KPMG, UK global leader for fintech investment in H1 2018 
https://home.kpmg/uk/en/home/media/press-releases/2018/07/uk-global-leader-for-fintech-
investment-in-h1-2018-.html 
- Lee H., “”All Authorized Institutios” (2016), http://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/key-
infonTiation/guidelines-and-circular/2016/ 20160906el.pdf [https://perma.cc/P578-LZV3] 
- Nemoto, N., B. Huang, and D. Storey 2019. Optimal Regulation of P2P Lending for Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises. ADBI Working Paper 912. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank 
Institute 
- Nersessian D.“The law and ethics of big data analytics: A new role for international human 
rights in the search for global standards” 2018, 61(6):Business Horizons. 845-854. 
- OCC, Press release OCC Begins Accepting National Bank Charter Applications From 
Financial Technology Companies https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-
releases/2018/nr-occ-2018-74.html 
- Pozzolo F. “Fıntech And Bankıng. Frıends Or Foes?” (2017) http://european-economy.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/EE_2.2017.pdf 
- SEC, US. Securities and Exchange Commission, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-
noaction/2019/turnkey-jet-040219-2a1.htm  
« Regulating Financial Technology – Opportunities and Risks» 
 72 
- Stone T., Can Fintech Startups Become Banks? OCC Opens The Gates 
https://debanked.com/2018/08/can-fintech-startups-become-banks-occ-opens-the-gates 
- The Goldman Sachs 2009 Annual Report http://www.goldmansachs.com/investor-
relations/financials/archived/annual-reports/2009-annual-report.html 
- United Nations,“Financial Regulatory Reform After The Crisis Trade And Development Report, 
(2015) https://unctad.org/en/PublicationChapters/tdr2015ch4_en.pdf 
- UNSGSA FinTech Working Group and CCAF. (2019). Early Lessons on Regulatory 
Innovations to Enable Inclusive FinTech: Innovation Offices, Regulatory Sandboxes, and 
RegTech. Office of the UNSGSA and CCAF: New York, NY and Cambridge, UK. Pg.15 
- Yoon K. And Jun J. “Liability And Antifraud Investment In Fintech Retail Payment Services” ( 
Contemporary Economy Policy Vol. 37, No. 1 2019) 
- Zetzche D. A. and others,”From Fintech to TechFin: The Regulatory Challenges of Data 
Driven Finance” University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2017/007 
(2017)  
 
News and magazine articles 
-  
- 1 Zhou Xin  ,Chinese police swoop on HK$59 billion ‘record-breaking online Ponzi 
scheme’https://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/1908003/chinese-police-swoop-
hk59-billion-record-breaking-online-ponzi 
- . FCA, What Is Crowdfunding? https://www.ukcfa.org.uk/what-is-crowdfunding/ 
- “China's peer-to-peer lenders face crisis, investors face ruin”  
- Alipay, https://intl.alipay.com 
- Almeleg K. The Legal Nature of Bitcoin and Altcoins The FinTech Edition 2018 Published by 
FinTecHub London, 2018 LLM 
- Andreessen M., Why Bitcoin Matters, N.Y. TIMES 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/21/why-bitcoin-matters. 
- Bata A., The Brief on Bitcoins, STEWART MCKELVEY LAW. (Feb. 26, 2014), 
http://stewartmckelveyblogs.com/themedium/2014/02/26/the-brief-on- bitcoins/.  
- BBVA, What is a regulatory sandbox?,  https://www.bbva.com/en/what-is-regulatory-sandbox/ 
« Regulating Financial Technology – Opportunities and Risks» 
 73 
- Binham C., ‘‘UK regulators are the most fintech friendly”, Financial Times (2016) 
https://www.ft.com/content/ff5b0be4-7381-11e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a 
- Blockchain Explained https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/blockchain.asp 
- China Banking Regulatory Commission 
- China Fintech Market - Growth, Trends, and Forecast (2019 - 2024) 
https://www.researchandmarkets.com/research/bg5wwx/china_fintech?w=5 
- Cryptocurrency thefts, scams hit $1.7 billion in 2018: report https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
crypto-currency-crime/cryptocurrency-thefts-scams-hit-1-7-billion-in-2018-report-
idUSKCN1PN1SQ 
- Dastin J., Disruption in Amazon's cloud service ripples through 
internethttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-aws-outages-idUSKBN1672E2 
- DiBiasio J., ICBC chairman welcomes fintech regs, FINANCE ASIA (Aug. 17, 2015), 
http://www.financeasia.com/News/400732,icbc-chairman-welcomes-fintech-regs.aspx. 
- FCA, “Advice Unit”, (2018) https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/advice-unit  
- FCA, Money transfer scams https://www.fca.org.uk/consumers/money-transfer-scams 
- FCA, Regulatory sandbox (2015) https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/regulatory-
sandbox.pdf 
- Feschyn A., “The Impact Of Big Data On Banking And Financial Systems” 
https://dataconomy.com/2017/07/big-data-banking-financial-systems/ 2017 
- Fraud in FinTech https://www.taylorwessing.com/download/article-fraud-in-fintech.html 
- Goldfinch P., “A global guide to fintech and future payment trends” (Routledge, 2019) pg.  
- Gong L. and Yu Y., Blockchain and Cryptocurrency Regulation 2019 China 
https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/blockchain-laws-and-
regulations/china#chaptercontent2 
- Hsu S., China “Fintech Today: The P2P Boom Is Truly Over”” 
https://supchina.com/2019/02/27/china-fintech-today-the-p2p-boom-is-truly-over/ 
https://www.dw.com/en/chinas-peer-to-peer-lenders-face-crisis-investors-face-ruin/a-47634861 
- J.  J., . “Lending Fraud Detection : A Big Data Approach.” Hazleton, P., & Usa (2015) pg. 71. 
- Jia Chen and He Wei, (2019)“PBOC reins in funds of payment platforms” 
http://www.china.org.cn/business/201901/15/content_74373549.htm 
« Regulating Financial Technology – Opportunities and Risks» 
 74 
- Kaminska I., Why money laundering risk is very real with crypto 
cardshttps://ftalphaville.ft.com/2019/05/31/1559275247000/Why-money-laundering-risk-is-
very-real-with-crypto-cards/ 
- Kelly J. A “fintech sandbox” might sound like a harmless idea. It's not 
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/12/05/1543986004000/A--fintech-sandbox--might-sound-like-a-
1  
- Kharpal A., “Ethereum briefly crashed from $319 to 10 cents in seconds on one exchange 
after ‘multimillion dollar’ trade” https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/22/ethereum-price-crash-10-
cents-gdax-exchange-after-multimillion-dollar-trade.html 2017 
- Liubing Liubing C., Online P2P lending to be recorded at central bank credit reference system 
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201909/05/WS5d707df8a310cf3e35569e28.html 
- Lom A., Browndorf R. SEC issues first no-action letter for unregulated ICO 2019 
https://www.regulationtomorrow.com/us/sec-issues-first-no-action-letter-for-unregulated-ico/ 
- Lovells H., Third Party Payment Licences in China - Are They within The Grasp of Foreign 
Investors? http://www.lapres.net/hl.pdf 
- McGee T., “How Millennials Are Changing Retail Patterns” 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tommcgee/2017/01/23/the-rise-of-the-millennial/#1b6175015f74 
- Microfinance, E- Commerce, Big Data and China: The Alibaba Story, CGAP (Oct. 11, 2013), 
http://www.cgap.org/blog/ microfinance-e-commerce-big-data-and-china-alibaba-story. 
- Ming X., Controlling interst https://www.pressreader.com 
- Mobile payments continue meteoric rise 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201903/21/WS5c932294a3104842260b1cc9.html 
- P2P Lending: A rising market with growth opportunities outweighing existing challenges 
https://medium.com/novum-global-ventures/p2p-lending-a-rising-market-with-growth-
opportunities-outweighing-existing-challenges-2e73c83aa74d 
- Pilarowski G., Yue L., “China Bans Initial Coin Offerings and Cryptocurrency Trading 
Platforms” http://www.pillarlegalpc.com/en/news/2017/09/21/china-bans-initial-coin-offerings-
and-cryptocurrency-trading-platforms/ 
- Q1 2019 Cryptocurrency Anti-Money Laundering Report https://ciphertrace.com/articles/q1-
2019-cryptocurrency-anti-money-laundering-report/ 
« Regulating Financial Technology – Opportunities and Risks» 
 75 
- Robinson A.and Tom Hingley, 'Smart Contracts: The Next Frontier?' (Oxford Law Faculty, 
2016) https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2016/05/smart-contracts-next-frontier 
- Rühl G., “The Law Applicable to Smart Contracts, or Much Ado About Nothing?” 
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2019/01/law-applicable-smart-contracts-or-
much-ado-about-nothing 
- Sachs G. S., and others, “CFPB No-Action Letters: Is There a Benefit?” 
https://www.paulhastings.com/publications-items/details/?id=7aa8e869-2334-6428-811c-
ff00004cbded 
- Stahl L., “The Future of Money” https://www.cbsnews.com/news/future-of-money-kenya-m-
pesa-60-minutes/ (2015) 
- Survey Shows Americans Trust Technology Firms More Than Banks and Retailers, LET’S 
TALK PAYMENTS (Jun. 25, 2015), http://letstalkpayments.com/survey-shows-americans-
trust-technology-firms- more-than-banks-and-retailers/. 
- The Economist Corporate Network The Future of Digital Finance 
https://www.corporatenetwork.com/media/1617/the-future-of-digital-finance_web.pdf 
- UK Payment Markets Summary, https://www.ukfinance.org.uk/system/files/Summary-UK-
Payment-Markets-2018.pdf 
- Vigna P.and Casey M. J., “Cryptocurrency : the future of money” (Vintage, 2016) 
- Webster P., Fintech: Are banks responding appropriately? 2015 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-fintech-are-banks-responding- 
appropriately/$FILE/EY-fintech-are-banks-responding-appropriately.pdf./ 
 
